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Kentucky Homicide
Law With Recommendations*
By Roy MoiiADi
Homicide naturally is a very oid crime. From the beginnings
of time men have killed each other, under many circumstances
and for many reasons. Cam who killed his brother, Abel, because
of ]ealousy, is but one of the long line and his motivation for the
crime only one of the many chroicled in the books.'
This very variety in the land of persons who kill and the
numerousness of their motivations create great diversity in so-
ciety's mind as to what should be done with such offenders. The
problem is made even more difficult by the inevitable con-
comitant, the moral question, as to what should be done with
those who take human life. People differ widely, and emotionally,
in their ideas and "feelings" as to that factor.
It is astoishing, but true, that the law of honucide made
comparatively little development from the end of the seventeenth
century until around the end of the nineteenth. Judge Stephen,
* The 1960 Legislature passed a resolution directing the Legislative Research
Commission (hereinafter referred to as the LRC) to make a study of homicide law
in Kentucky and to report its findings to the 1962 Legislature. The writer worked
as consultant on that project. This paper is his study but the LRC made its own
report to the Legislature which difers almost wholly from this study, although
the LRC's report contained the recommendations in this study appended at its
end. However, mental deficiency was not recommended as a reducing agent. As
is well known, the LRC does not engage in legislation in any degree and did not
participate in the passage of the bill involving involuntary manslaughter found in
this study and adopted by the 1962 Legislature. Part of the purpose of the
publication of this study in its present form is to show the. situation in Kentucky
law which occasioned the passage of this involuntary manslaughter statute. Two
semor law students, Messrs. Earl F Martin, Jr., and Lloyd Cress, contributed
matenally to this study as did Mrs. Lena Craig and Roy Pennington of the LRC;
Mr. H. Jefferson Herbert, Jr., edited the footnotes for form (only).
0* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law; LL.B., Uni-
versity of Kentucky; J.D., University of Chicago; S.J.D., Harvard University.I1Th word murder, itself, is a very old wordgoing back to the Norman
conquest of England or further. After the Normans "liberated"-to give the word
a modem twist-the Anglo-Saxons, they sought satisfaction in secret slaymgs of the
invaders by waylaying. To crush this evil the Normans levied a heavy amerce-
ment fine called the murdruin upon any hundred where a Norman was found
slam. By 1340 the people had become 'merged" and the fine was abolished but
the word lived on as the worst land of homicide although without its former
meaning. Moreland, The Law of Homicide 9- (1952).
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an English jurist, made a studied and fruitful attempt to analyze
and categorize the law of murder in 1883,2 and this effort, m the
opinon of the writer, marks the beginning of a current vigorous
attempt to rationalize and modermze the entire field of homicide.
Considerable particular and intensive research in tis country has
been made in the past twenty or thirty years by a number of
competent forward-looking individuals and organizations. Three
of these studies are the careful and exhaustive study to be found
in the Report of the New York Law Revision Committee on
Homicide,3 a long article in the Columbia Law Review by Her-
bert Wechsler and Jerome Michael, 4 and the discussion and
proposed statutory provision to be found in the Model Penal Code
now in preparation by the American Law Institute.5 In addition,
there is a new Homicide Act in England which changes the law
somewhat m that jurisdiction.6 It has been the writer's purpose
to make a study of homicide as found in these and other available
materials7 and in Kentucky statutes and decisions and to make
such findings and recommendations as seem advisable.
I. MulimM
(a) Intentional Murder
Judge Stephen in his memorable analysis and categorization
of the crime of murder divided the state of mind requisite for the
offense into four categories, the first of which he described as
follows:
An intention to cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm
to, some person, whether such person is the person actually
killed or not.8
This category embodies what is usually called the common
law intentional murder. It includes not only those unlawful
2 3 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England 80-81 (1883); Turner
v. Commonwealth, 167 Ky. 365, 367, 180 S.W 768, 770 (1915), contains Judge
Stephen s analysis.
3 1937 Rep. of the Law Rev. Comm n of N.Y. 515.
4 Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homnde, 37 Col. L. Rev.
1261 (1937).
5 Model Penal Code §201 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
6 Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, see 202 Hi.L. Deb. 726 (5th ser.
1957). See generally Prevezer, The English Homicde Act: A New Attempt to
Revise the Law of Murder, 57 Col. L. Rev. 624 (1957).
7 E.g., Moreland, op. cit. supra note 1, at 307-14; Moreland, A Suggested
Homicide Statute for Kentucky, 41 Ky. L.J. 139 (1953).
83 Stephen, op. cit. supra note 2, at 80-81.
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homicides which the killer actually "willed" but also several other
unusual situations to be mentioned laterY
What changes have been made by the Kentucky Legislature
in the common law intended murder? The only Kentucky statute
on murder is one which punishes "willful" murder by confinement
in the penitentiary for life, or by death.10 It has been said that
the Kentucky courts look to the common law for the definition
of "willful" murder." That being so, the statutory offense should
include such common law situations as a killing resulting from an
intent to inflict grievous bodily harm only,'2 a homicide resulting
from an act "substantially certain" to cause death,12a and a death
resulting from an application of the well-recogmzed doctrine of
"transferred intent." 2b three situations embraced in the common
law definition. However, these are incidental situations which are
not ordinarily written specifically into statutory definitions; the
main point is that this Kentucky statute codifies the common law
intended murder, using however the word "willful" instead of
"intended."'3
There are no degrees of murder in Kentucky Similarly, there
are no degrees of murder at common law and all murder is
punished by death. Today, however, most jurisdictions divide the
crime into degrees by statute. The primary purpose in doing this
9 See generally Moreland, A Suggested Honmcide Statute for Kentucky, 41 Ky.
L.J. 139, 141-45 (1953).10 Ky. Rev. Stat. §435.010 (1959) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
11 Commonwealth v. Illinois C.R.R., 152 Ky. 320, 153 S.W 459 (1913).
12 Roberson, New Kentucky Cnmnal Law and Procedure §350 & n.5 (2d ed.
1927) (no Kentucky cases cited). See generally Moreland, The Law of Homicide
17-20 (1952).12a Moreland, The Law of Honucide 18 & n.5 (1952).
12b Shelton v. Commonwealth, 145 Ky. 543, 140 S.W 670 (1911); Wheatley
v. Commonwealth, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 436, 81 S.W 687 (Ct. App. 1904); see Note,
34 Ky. L.J. 224 (1946) (Kentucky cases cited). See generally Moreland, The
Law of Homicide 17-20 (1952).
1 Another matter involved in the intended murder is proof of intent. Of
course, the defendant may plead guilty or he may have uttered language at the
time of the killing which showed a subjective intent. But, where intent was not
affirmatively indicated the common law raised an inference of intent based upon
conduct in at least two instances. Very early in the law it became the rule that
once it was proved that the defendant committed a killing it was inferred that he
did it with express malice (intentionally), thus putting the burden on him of
proving circumstances of alleviation, excuse or justification. But the rule has been
repudiated in England, it has been much criticised in this country, and it is
believed and hoped that Kentucky would not apply it at the present time if the
question were properly presented. See the critical and excellent Note, 34 Ky. L.J.
306 (1946). The common law raised a second inference of intent from conduct
where the killing resulted from the use of a deadly weapon. The doctrine has
been criticised but remains firmly entrenched in the law. As to these two infer-
ences of intent see Moreland, The Law of Homicide 20-30 (1952).
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is to relieve the harshness of the situation at common law by
limiting the use of the death penalty Many believe that the
division of the crime into degrees, with the death penalty reserved
for the first degree only, accomplishes this purpose.
Pennsylvaia was the first state to divide murder into degrees,
and the most common definitions of both first and second degree
murder are still the ones derived from this pioneer Pennsylvania
act of 1794.i4
The definition of first degree murder under the Pennsylvania
act included (a) willful, deliberate and premeditated killing,
and (b) homicide occurring in the commission of certain named
felomes. The most common modem statutory definition of second
degree murder, also derived from the Pennsylvania act is, in sub-
stance, "all other homicides which would have been murder at
common law"' 5
While the word deliberate has some connotation in the
Pennsylvama act, it should be particularly noted that the Act
introduces the word premeditated into the definition of in-
tended murder in defining murder in the first degree. Intended
murder which is not premeditated is murder in the second degree
under the Pennsylvaina act and under most modern statutes.
While Kentucky has not attempted to alleviate the harshness
of the common law rule of death for all intended murder by
dividing intended murder into degrees, the state has met the
problem in another way by providing a choice to the jury of
imprisonment for life or death as the punishment for intended
murder.
The Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute has a
third method of wording the definition of the intended murder.
The intended murder provision in this Code states that a criminal
homicide constitutes murder when it is committed "purposely
and knowingly"-'6 The word '"mowmgly" does not, it is believed,
have value or real meamng in this defmition. If it has to do with
the requisite of mental responsibility, it adds nothing to "pur-
posely," for it is only those who have mental competence that are
held criminally responsible for purposeful acts. It is also true that
14Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Honuczde, 37 Col. L. Rev.
701, 704-05 (1937); 1937 Rep. of Law Rev. Comm n of N.Y. 543.
15 Wechsler & Michael, supra note 14, at 705.
16 Model Penal Code §201.2(1) (a) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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the word deliberate is used in many intentional murder statutes
to indicate more than mere intention, to show that the accused's
mind "weighed and considered alternate courses of conduct and
finally made a choice-to kill."1 7 But, while this has some pur-
suasion, it may be said as a practical matter that an intentional
act requires a weighing and a determined choice. The net result
of all this reasoning is that the addition of words like deliberate
and knowingly adds nothing of practical value to a statute which
uses either wiful., purposely, or intentional to describe the willed
murder.
Those who drew the intentional murder provision for the
Model Penal Code had difficulty in determining the punishment
for the offense. As originally drawn the death penalty was
excluded. The Code provided simply that "murder is a felony of
the first degree."18 The Code provides in section 6.06(1) that
a person convicted of a felony of the first degree may be sentenced
to imprisonment for a term "the maximum of which shall be life
imprisonment." However, a later bracketed provision was added
providing for the death penalty in the alternative. As this is
written, the membership of the Institute is being circularized as
to whether the alternate bracketed provision providing for the
death penalty shall remain in the Model Code.19 This lack of
decision as to the retention or rejection of the death penalty is
indicative of the general national indecision on this matter.
England is going through a similar indecision on the matter but
after much agitation, the 1957 English Homicide Act retained
the death penalty for certain murders 20
At common law the intentional murder is defined as an unlaw-
ful killing with express malice aforethought. England still uses
that outmoded wording in her definition of murder in the 1957
Honcide Act.2' The use of "willf-u'22 to describe the intentional
murder in Kentucky's statute is synonymous with the phrase
17 Moreland, The Law of Homicide 207 (1952).
I8 Model Penal Code §201.2(2) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
'9 Model Penal Code §210.6(2), as finally written, retains a possible death
penalty.
aO Honncde Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, Part II, 5(1); see Prevezer, The
English Homwicde Act; A New Attempt to Remse the Law of Murder, 57 Col. L.
Rev. 624, 632 (1957).
2 English Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, Part I, 1(1).
22 Stephen used the word "intention." Moreland, The Law of Homicide 17
n.2 (1952).
1962.]
ENTUCK Y LAW JOURNAL
with express malice aforethought; each will receive exactly the
same interpretation and exactly the same interpretation would
follow if the words intentional, purposely, or deliberate2 3 were
used. So the problem is, wich is the better choice?
After considering the various possible phrasings for an in-
tended murder statute, it has been concluded to recommend the
wording of the present Kentucky statute which uses the word
willful to define the offense. It has a clear meaning, it is work-
able in the hands of the ordinary juryman, it is explicit. Naturally,
as at present, the word would receive a common law mterpreta-
tion. Tis decision results m a repudiation of the use of the word
premeditation as a device for separating murder into degrees
for the purpose of giving differing degrees of pumshment. It is
becoming commonly accepted that that device has failed to fulfill
its purpose. The word naturally connotes a planned event; the
determination to kill must be made beforehand. But, as Cardozo
has pointed out,2 4 the courts have so watered down the meaning
of the word that no appreciable amount of time is needed; the
meditation and the killing may be just short of simultaneous. An
attempt to cure this sort of watering down of the term m the
statute was made in a book ten years ago25 by defining the word
premeditation in the statute itself, hoping thereby to force the
courts to interpret it in its natural dictionary meaning. But it has
been decided that this will not help-the courts, under the per-
suasion of the lawyers, will continue to water down the meaning
of the word. The framers of the Model Penal Code have come
to the same conclusion and so have not divided murder into
degrees in their model statute.
A determination to eliminate the use of premeditation as a
device for dividing murder into degrees to alleviate the harshness
of pumshment does not change the fact, however, that some
method must be devised to allow such alleviation for it is accepted
23For illustrations of the use of the word deliberate, see Moreland, The
Law of Homicide 200 (1952).
24 Cardozo, Law, Literature and Other Addresses 97-99 (1931).25 Moreland, The Law of Homicide 212 (1952). See generally id. at 208-12.
The Model Penal Code comment also points out that many murders com-
mitted without premeditation are committed with as much cruelty and with a
disposition as dangerous to society as are shown in premeditated murders. For
example, a man makes advances to a girl who repels him; he deliberately but
instantly kills her. For the discussion and other illustrations see Model Penal Code
§201.6 at 70, comments (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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today that all murderers should not receive the death penalty or,
perhaps, even the same penalty The present Kentucky statute
meets the problem by allowing a choice between death and
imprisonment for life. Should this punishment for the offense be
further refined? It is believed that it should. It is recommended
that the jury have three choices instead of two as at present.
These three recommended choices will be discussed in turn:
(1) It is accepted that although death as a punishment for
murder is fading, the time has not come, as yet, for its
total elimination. Statutes eliminating the death pen-
alty failed in the 1960 and 1962 Kentucky Legislature.
In spite of intense agitation against the continuance of
capital punishment in that country, the new 1957
English Homicide Act continues its use for certain
crimes. 26 The day for the total abolishment of capital
punishment may come, but it is not here yet.
(2) One objection to the present choice in Kentucky be-
tween death and imprisonment for life is a practical
one. Instead of a real choice between death and life im-
prisonment, there is a choice between death and life
imprisonment with a possibility of parole in eight years,
since in this state a sentence for life is subject to parole
after that period 2T-and parole may in fact be given if
prison behavior has been good. Death may be more
punishment than the jury wishes to give, but a pos-
sibility of an eight year sentence may be less! There
are not enough choices.
An editorial in the Louisville Courier Journal (Tuesday,
February 16, 1960) offers the best solution to this problem that
has been seen by those working on the proposed act. The
editorial points out that for crimes that appear to have some
extenuating circumstances juries are often reluctant to give a
death sentence, while for offenses which shock the community a
life sentence which can end in eight years sometimes sets off a
public outcry The result is that Kentucky seems to have more
than its share of hung juries, members of which are reluctant to
take one responsibility or the other.
At the time the editorial was written a bill was pending in
both houses of the Kentucky Legislature with a purpose to
26 Honmcide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, Part II, 5(1).
27KRS 439.110(3).
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remedy this gap. This bill would have added a third choice, life
imprisonment without parole. This has been tried in some ]uns-
dictions. But, as the editorial pointed out, this bill also contained
a rigidity which might make it as difficult to enforce as the death
penalty is now Besides, as the editorial might have stated, it has
been found difficult to control prisons containing a large popula-
tion serving sentences of life without hope of parole. Hopeless,
they not periodically and violently
To remedy the situation in Kentucky, the editorial offered still
another choice-a mmimum of twenty years imprisonment before
possibility of parole. With this suggestion those studying the
Homicide Act are in full accord. The minimum period need not
bebe twenty years; it could be fifteen, for instance. But the sug-
gested minimum period is persuasive and perhaps about what
is wanted. This is a severe pumshment, but it evades the objec-
tions to the death penalty and leaves the prisoner not without
hope.
(8) The third choice is, of course, the present one of un-
prsonnient for life with a possibility of parole in eight
years or at any time thereafter.
Thus, a jury could choose between death, a minimum term of
twenty years before possible parole, and inprisonment for life
with a possibility of parole in eight years. However, either the
second or third choice might result, in unusual cases, i nnpnson-
ment for the prisoners life in the discretion of the parole board
and in the absence of executive clemency The law as it stands
does not give a conscientious jury enough choice. But the addi-
tion of this third choice would seem to provide sufficient latitude
for all.
Perhaps it should be pointed out that it is arguable that one
who receives a sentence of inprisonment for life should not be
eligible for parole in the short period of eight years as he is in
Kentucky However, the matter is argumentative. Good reasons
can be given pro and con. It is thought better to approach the
problem by giving a third choice to the jury rather than by sug-
gesting a change in KRS 439.110(3) A number of states now
provide that one serving a life sentence is not eligible for parole
until he has served fifteen or more years; the statute recommended
herein is umque in providing the equivalent of a division of the
EVol. 51,
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life sentence into two categones,thus affording a choice to the
jury 28
To summarize the discussion, an intentional murder statute
embodying the recommendations contained hereto might be
worded substantially as follows:
Any person who commits willful murder shall be punished by
confinement in the penitentiary for life, or for a minimum term of
twenty years before becoming eligible for parole, or by death.
These recommendations change existing Kentucky law in only
one particular-a third choice of punishment is provided.
(b) Negligent Murder
The discussion turns now to the second category in Judge
Stephen's analysis of common law murder-the negligent murder.
The early English cases and classic common law treatises enumer-
ate a series of extremely dangerous acts which are described in
terms of conduct evincing "a depraved heart regardless of human
life," "a heart devoid of social duty and fatally bent on mischief,"
and similar picturesque phrases.29 The examples given include
such acts as the tossing of a timber or heavy object off a roof,
causing it to fall into a crowded thoroughfare.
While early writers differ as to the basis of liability in cases
involving extremely dangerous acts,30 Stephen puts them all into
one category 3 This category is within the general concept of
negligence, but is to be distinguished from the negligence re-
quired for manslaughter and various other lesser offenses by the
relatively higher degree of danger involved in the act and the
relatively greater indifference to the lives and safety of others
manifested by it. The two problems involved in drafting a defim-
ion or test of the negligent murder consist of describing the
requisite higher degree of danger and relatively greater indiffer-
ence to the lives and safety of others.
2 8 Under KRS 489.135 one receiving a sentence of imprisonment for life is
eligible for parole in eight years. As a matter of information, a table showing the
eligibility ofprisoners for parole serving life imprisonment for murder in capital
punishment junsdictons may be found in the Model Penal Code app. F at 180
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
29 For a listing of a series of these phrases, see 1937 Rep. of Law Rev.
Comm n of N.Y. 622-23.
30 Id. at 623-25.
313 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England 80 (1883).
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It is believed that the discontinuance of the use of the
ambiguous words and phrases commonly used to describe the
high degree of danger and the utter indifference to the safety of
others required for the crime would make for clarity and stability
in the law With that in mind it is suggested that, in those
jurisdictons which adopt the negligent murder, one who unin-
tentionally kills another should be guilty if the homicide is com-
mitted by an act creating such extreme risk of death or great
bodily injury as to manifest a wanton indifference to the value of
human life according to the standard of the conduct of a reason-
able man under the circumstances.
Three things are of importance in this test. First, the degree
of danger must be extreme. There are increasingly higher degrees
of danger required in the ascending homicide crimes arising out
of negligence. But for murder the degree of danger must be
extreme. Murder is a most serious offense, and murder by negli-
gence is unintentional. For such a serious unintentional homicide
only an extremely dangerous act should suffice to create liability
The second and third points in the definition are related.
Civil negligence and negligence on the manslaughter level are
commonly judged by the objective standard of the conduct of
the reasonable man. There is a decided trend toward making the
standard of conduct on the murder level an objective one also-
the conduct of a reasonable man.32 But the phrases coming down
from the historic common law treatises indicate that this conduct
must be so utterly blame-worthy as to show a depraved heart, an
individual devoid of a sense of social duty The suggested defim-
tion uses the word wanton to indicate this great zndifference to
the safety of others. One who is wantonly negligent has utter
indifference for the safety of others. His conduct is so repre-
hensible that it indicates he just does not give a damn for the
safety of others. This is strong language, but the depraved heart
phraseology of the common law is strong language also, indicative
of the monster the defendant has to be to be convicted of a
murder by negligence.
There is some question, however, whether the word wanton
is the best word to use to describe this utter indifference to the
safety of others required for the negligent murder. This is be-
82 Moreland, The Law of Homicide 86 (1952).
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cause, while the word cares the proper connotation of utter
indifference, it may be questioned whether the word carries a
connotation of negligence. One of the several meanings given the
word by the dictionary is "arrogant recklessness."3 3 Recklessness
does connote negligence. It will be found later in tins paper that
recklessness is commonly used to describe the negligence requi-
site for manslaughter. Add to the word recklessness the vitupera-
tive arrogant and just about the proper connotation is obtained.
And there the study group proposes to let the matter rest.
And yet, repudiating the use of wantonly, the new Model
Penal Code has chosen to describe the negligent murder as one
"committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life."13  Tins definition, the
compilers of the Code believe, adequately describes the necessary
blameworthiness requisite for the crime.35 But recklessly does
not carry the connotation that is required; it lacks the descriptive
accuracy to precisely describe the utter disregard or indifference
to the value of human life that must be present. Besides, it is the
word used to describe the negligent manslaughter, and judges
and juries would find it a continuing matter of difficulty to dis-
tinguish the negligence requisite for the two offenses if the same
word were used to describe each, even though qualifying phrases
were added.
Another solution to the problem has been suggested by
Gerhard Mueller, 6 a leader in the criimal law field and a pro-
fessor of law in the New York University School of Law Pro-
fessor Mueller suggests that the proper connotative result might
be achieved by ommitting the use of any word, whether it be
recklessly, wantonly, or some other term. The Model Code
itself hints at this possibility by stating in the comments that
"the conception that the draft employs is that of extreme indiffer-
ence to the value of human life."3" Professor Wechsler, who
drafted the Model Code, made a similar suggestion when in pro-
posing revisions in the Illinois Criminal Code several years ago
he recommended that the actor should be guilty of a negligent
33 Webster, New International Dictionary 2871 (2d ed. 1944).
34 Model Penal Code §201.2(1) (b) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
35 Model Penal Code §201.2(1) (b), comment at 29-33 (Tent, Draft No. 9,
1959).
30 Letter to the writer.37 Model Penal Code §201.2 comment at 29 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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murder when the death "is the result of an act which is utterly
disregardful of the consequences."88 If the descriptive word were
thus omitted, the definition, whether that of the study group or
of the Model Code, could then be worded to state that a negli-
gent homicide would be murder when committed by an act
extremely dangerous and indicating under all the circumstances
extreme indifference to the lives and safety of others. Hence
two elements would be required, an extremely dangerous act
and an indication under all the circumstances of extreme indif-
ference to the safety of others. The circumstances might include
such factors as that the actor was driving while drnkmng heavily,
that he was driving at high speed, that he had run several stop
lights before the accident, that he had a "common woman" in
his car, that he was impudent and truculent at the time of the
accident.
The study group would probably go along with such a defim-
tion. It points up the high degree of the danger and spells out
the extreme indifference which is required of the actor. The
study group, however, would in the end prefer their original
definition, if the decision were theirs to make, because a jury
would have trouble getting its teeth into the meaning of the
phrase, extreme indifference. When is indifference extreme?
A jury, it is believed, would know better what is a wanton act
than what is extreme indifference. The word wanton is more
definite and connotative of the type of person who would be guilty
of such an act. The ultimate question remains, though, whether
it is connotative in terms of negligence. The study group believes
that it is.
As stated earlier, there is no statutory negligent murder in
Kentucky; the state simply puishes "willful murder." 9 Whether
the common law negligent murder survives in the state is debat-
able. A line of Kentucky cases holds that it does survive;
another line holds that it does not. Eunng v. Commonwealth0
is illustrative of the line of cases holding that the common law
8 8 Wechsler, Proposed Rem'sons in the Illinois Criminal Code, 48 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 198, 213 (1953).
89 KRS 435.010.
40 129 Ky. 237, 111 S.W 352 (1908) (citing other Kentucky cases); accord,
Lucas v. Commonwealth, 231 Ky. 76, 21 S.W.2d 113 (1929). See also Davis v.
Commonwealth, 193 Ky. 597, 237 S.W 24 (1922).
[Vol. 51,
KENTUcKY HOMICIE LAw
offense does not survive in Kentucky That case states that while
at common law malice would be implied from a shooting arising
out of the reckless use of a firearm, the doctrine of implied malice
is rejected in Kentucky The court went on to say-
When we reject the doctrine of implied malice, the issue of
malice is a question for the jury, and the offense which
would othernse be murder becomes voluntary manslaugh-
ter, where under the evidence the jury find as a fact that
the killing was not done with malice aforethought. Accord-
ingly it has been held in Kentucky in a long line of cases
that, where one kills another by the wanton, reckless, or
grossly careless use of firearms, the offense, if without
malice aforethought, is voluntary manslaughter, although
he had no intention. (Emphasis added.) 41
Thus, this line of cases led to the introduction into this state
of the preposterous doctrine of negligent voluntary manslaughter,
accepted in only about one other jurisdiction, and criticized later
In this paper in the discussion of voluntary manslaughter.
The leading case in the line which holds that the common law
negligent murder does survive m this state is Brown v. Common-
wealth,42 where the accused fired a pistol in a crowded room,
killing one of the occupants. The appellate court affrmed a con-
viction of murder, saying:
If he did this not with the intention of killing anyone, but
for hIs diversion merely, but killed one of the crowd, he is
guilty of murder; for such conduct establishes general
malignity and recklessness of the lives and safety of others,
which proceed from a heart void of just sense of social duty
and fatally bent on mischief.' 43
This is an acceptance of the common law negligent murder;44
even the wording in the opinion is couched in the picturesque
language of the old text writers in their discussions of the crime.
The net result of these two lines of decisions in Kentucky is
that there is case authority in the state for three different crimes
involving homicide arising out of criminal negligence: murder,
41129 Ky. at 241, 111 S.W at 354.
42 13 Ky. L. Rep. 372, 17 S.W 220 (Ct. App. 1891).
43 13 Ky. L. Rep. 372, 373, 17 S.W 220, 221 (Ct. App. 1891).
44Hill v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 646, 40 S.W.2d 261 (1931); Golliher v.
Commonwealth, 63 Ky. (2 Dur.) 163 (1865); see Gregory, Kentucky Crimnal
Law, Procedure and Forms §70 (1918); Roberson, op. cit. supra note 12, §§358-62
(2d ed. 1927).
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voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. 5 Greg-
ory46 and Roberson 47 both cite cases supporting all three crnines
in their texts on Kentucky criminal law This has, of course,
created a great deal of confusion. One of the phases of the con-
fusion, the impossible voluntary negligent manslaughter, should
be weeded out of the law, but the problem still remains as to what
should be done about the negligent murder.
The problem was somewhat clarified, though by no means
solved, by the passage of a statute in 195048 limiting the punish-
ment for all common law crmes, the punishment for which is not
provided by statute, to a maxinum of imprisonment for a term
not exceeding twelve months in the county jail or a 5,000 dollar
fine or both. This statute eliminates the probability of punishing
the common law negligent murder in this state at the present time,
since the punishment of involuntary manslaughter, a lesser crime,
is the same as provided for by this statute. This is because there
is no statutory involuntary manslaughter in Kentucky, and so the
crime is a common law offense and, as such, also punished under
the same 1950 statute as the common law negligent murder. The
punishment being the same, a prosecutor will naturally prose-
cute for involuntary manslaughter rather than for negligent
murder, since there is a greater possibility that he will get a
conviction from the jury for that offense. Unfortunately, the
crime of negligent voluntary manslaughter continues after the
statute of 1950 since there is a statutory punishment for volun-
tary manslaughter.
A decision must now be made as to what is to be done about
the negligent murder in drafting a recommended homicide act
for Kentucky The study group has decided to choose one of the
three of the various possibilities suggested in the discussion.
These three are:
(a) to recommend a statute embodying the negligent mur-
der, describing the offense as a homicide committed by
an act creating such extreme risk of death or great
45 To these three may now be added a fourth, the new statutory offense,
homicide resulting from a negligently operated motor vehicle. KIRS 435.025
(enacted in 1952).46 Gregory, op. cit. supra note 42, §70.
47 Roberson, op. cit. supra note 12, §§358-62.
48 KRS 431.075.
[Vol. 51,
KENTa'ucXy HOMICIDE LAw
bodily injury as to manifest a wanton indifference to
the value of human life
(b) to omit the use of any word to describe the extreme
indifference requisite for the negligent murder, whether
the word be wanton, reckless, or some other term.
An unintended homicide would then be a negligent
murder when committed by an act extremely danger-
ous and indicating under all the circumstances extreme
indifference to the lives and safety of others."
(c) to omit the negligent murder from the recommended
act.
From these three choices the study group has decided to
recommend (c), omission of the negligent murder from the
recommended act.
There are several arguments against the omission of the negli-
gent murder from the recommended act. While junes rarely
convict offenders of the negligent murder, they do occasionally
do so in those jurisdictions where the offense is a part of the
homicide laws. And it may be urged that occasionally a negli-
gent homicide is so heinous that it deserves a murder con-
viction. An examination of the cases noted m the American
Digest System for the past twenty-five years reveals some cases
where the defendant was convicted of the offense. It may be
argued that it is wise to keep the crime on the statute books to
take care of such cases. One must also take cognizance of the
fact that the offense is an old, historic one and that it is included
in the new Model Code of the American Law Institute and in
the new English Homicide Act.
There is another argument for recommending the inclusion
of the negligent murder in the proposed Kentucky act. At present
the common law offense is outlawed in effect by KRS 431.075,
but, most unfortunately, tn place of the common law negligent
murder the Kentucky Court of Appeals has invented the inpos-
sible hybrid offense, the negligent voluntary manslaughter. If
the negligent murder is omitted from the recommended act it
would be difficult to weed the negligent voluntary manslaughter
out of Kentucky law Would the Kentucky Court of Appeals have
the courage to do so? That may well be doubted for they have
refused to do so up to this good hour although the offense has
been repeatedly criticized and members of the court have ob-
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jected to it privately The problem of getting the negligent
voluntary manslaughter out of Kentucky law is increased by the
fact that involuntary manslaughter, which is what a negligent
homicide would be if the negligent murder were eliminated, is
not a statutory offense in this state under existing law but a
common law misdemeanor puishable under KRS 431.075 by a
punishment of a maximum imprisonment of twelve months m the
county jail or a fine not exceeding 5,000 dollars, or both. Such a
punishment would not be sufficient for a negligent homicide ans-
ing out of extremely dangerous, wanton conduct, which was prob-
ably the chief reason for the birth of the negligent voluntary man-
slaughter, the punishment for voluntary manslaughter being the
statutory one of confinement m the penitentiary for not less than
two nor more than twenty-one years under KRS 435.020.
However, there are several arguments for omitting the negli-
gent murder from the proposed act. To omit the offense would
not change existing Kentucky practice since it is not practical
to prosecute common law negligent murder in the state at the
present time because of KRS 431.075. It is also true that while
either the statutory or common law negligent murder is in effect
in most states49 there are few convictions of the offense. Junes
cannot get away from the fact that such a homicide is in fact
unintentional and that most of us are negligent at times. This
attitude of mind upon the part of juries is indicated by the fact
that it has been found necessary to introduce the new offense,
homicide arising out of the negligent use of a motor vetnele,59
into the law because juries refuse in many cases to convict the
negligent offender of even involuntary manslaughter. All the
more do they refuse to convict of murder.
So there are arguments for including and for omitting the
negligent murder from the proposed homicide act. But weighing
all considerations, pro and con, the study group has decided to
omit the offense. This will not change the present Kentucky law
for any practical purpose since the punishment under KRS
431.075 is so small as to make it inexpedient to prosecute for
49 No statutes covering the negligent murder have been found in these nine
states: Alaska, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, Texas, and
Wyoming. In these junsdictions the offense is punished as a common law crane
except in those states where common law crimes have been abolished or there is
some statutory limitation, as in Kentucky.
50 In Kentucky this is KRS 435.025.
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common law negligent murder. However, since this has caused
the creation of the impossible crime, the negligent voluntary
manslaughter, the study group has deemed it necessary to devise
a way to eliminate that offense. This has been done in the pro-
posed act by creating the offense of involuntary manslaughter in
the first degree, which offense is discussed with particularity m
the section of this paper, infra, devoted to involuntary man-
slaughter.
(c) Felony Murder
The third category m Stephen's analysis of common law
murder embodies the felony murder doctrine.5 1 It was the his-
toric common law rule that if a death occurred in the commission
of an unlawful act it was murder or manslaughter depending
upon whether the unlawful act out of which the killing occurred
was a felony or a misdemeanor.52 Of course, this was extremely
harsh, particularly as to the felony murder, but it was not until
1883 that a real, open attack was made upon the doctrine. In that
year Judge Fitzjames Stephen made a vigorous, vitriolic attack
upon the doctrine in his History of the Criminal Law of Eng-
land.53
More importantly, Judge Stephen incorporated his views in
an opimon which he wrote four years later. Tis memorable
decision, Regina v. Serne,54 was buttressed upon the proposition
that the amount of danger in the felomous act and not its unlaw-
fulness should be the basis of liability in such cases. Specifically,
the case held that if a homicide occurred in the commission of a
felony it would not be murder unless the felony in itself was one
dangerous to life and likely in itself to cause death.
It will be mimediately perceived that when the felony murder
rule is stated in this manner it becomes parallel with the defim-
tion of the type of conduct requisite for the negligent murder.
The modem cases show an increasing tendency to make the two
51 Stephen stated that malice aforethought, constituting a sufficient mens
rea for murder, existed, in addition to three other situations discussed in this
paper, when the one who committed the homicide "had an intent to commit any
felony whatever" at the time he committed the killing. Moreland, The Law of
Homicide 17 n.2 (1952).
52 Indeed there is authority to the effect that in the time of Coke a homicide
occurring in the commission of any unlawful act was murder. Id. at 42.
58 3 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England 57-75 (1883).
54 [1887] 16 Cox Crun. Cas. 318.
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rules parallel stating that it is not the fact that the accused was
committing a felony when the homicide occurred that makes hin
crimnmally liable but it is because his act was so extremely
dangerous as to make it wantonly disregardful of the lives and
safety of others.5 This conception of the felony murder doctrine
is now being commonly incorporated in modem statutes which
make one who kills while committing a felony guilty under the
felony murder rule only when the felony is arson, rape, robbery
or burglary, all felonies ordinarily extremely dangerous m them-
selves to human life and safety 56 Such statutes serve a useful
purpose as transitional devices. When the felony element should
ultimately be removed from the rule these specific, named, usually
dangerous felonies would be omitted and only the wording
of the negligent murder would be used. Then the affirmative
burden would be on the prosecution n each and every case to
show extreme danger in the act of the accused which caused
death. Some cases have taken ths ultimately correct position.57
There is no statute embodying the felony murder m Kentucky
but it survives as a common law crime m this state.5 8 However,
the Kentucky cases dealing with the felony murder are confused
and uncertain. There is doubt whether the modem and more
acceptable rule that the felony in itself must involve an act
extremely dangerous to human life and safety is the rule or
whether the court has continued to apply the histonc doctrine
that a homicide occurring in the commission of any felony is
murder. 9 It is also inpossible to determine whether the Kentucky
court would require that the felony be the proximate cause of the
homicide; some courts do not.60
55 People v. Goldvarg, 846 Ill. 898, 178 N.E. 892 (1931) (arson); Williams
v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 830, 81 S.W.2d 891 (1935) (robbery); People v.
Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, 199 N.W 873 (1924) (selling liquor, a statutory felony)
(defendant was not convicted).
56 These are the four felomes incorporated in the statutes of some thirteen
states. E.g., Ala. Code tit. 14, §314 (1959); Ohio Rev. Code §2901.01 (Page
1954).
57 See, e.g., cases cited note 55 supra.58 Simpson v. Commonwealth, 293 Ky. 831, 170 S.W.2d 869 (1943); Whit-
field v. Commonwealth, 278 Ky. 111, 128 S.W.2d 208 (1939); Manon v. Com-
monwealth, 269 Ky. 729, 108 S.W.2d 721 (1987); Williams v. Commonwealth,
258 Ky. 830, 81 S.W.2d 891 (1935); Commonwealth v. Reddick, 17 Ky. L. Rep.
1020, 33 S.W 416 (Ct. App. 1895).
9 Note, 29 Ky. L.J. 130, 131 (1940). Contra, Note, 29 Ky. L.J. 128 (1940).108 6 People v. Kaye, 43 Cal. 802, 111 P.2d 679 (1941); Note, 36 Ky. Uj. 106,
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With the situation in this condition, the Legislature in 1950
passed KRS 481.075, mentioned in the discussion of the negli-
gent murder, supra, which limits the punishment for all common
law crimes, the punishment for which is not provided by statute,
to a maximum of confinement in the county jail for twelve
months or a 5,000 dollar fine, or both. That statute, as in the
case of the negligent murder, eliminates the felony murder in this
state for all practical purposes, since involuntary manslaughter,
which is not a statutory offense in Kentucky but a common law
misdemeanor, is also punishable under KRS 431.075, resulting
in the same penalty for involuntary manslaughter as for the
felony murder, and prosecutors would prefer to try an accused
under the manslaughter charge since a conviction by a jury for
that offense is more likely Unfortunately the negligent voluntary
manslaughter continues in this state. A prosecution for that
offense, which has a punishment under KRS 435.020 of a mini-
mum of two years and a maximum of twenty-one, is also a pos-
sibility in these cases based upon doing a felonious act, danger-
ous in itself constituting negligence. So while a prosecution for
felony murder remains technically possible at this tune, it is
beyond the realm of probability
If the felony murder is to be re-activated in Kentucky, it
should be in accordance with the accepted modem interpretation
of the offense, that is, that the felony out of which the honncide
occurs must be extremely dangerous in itself. In that context,
three modem, current ways of handling the problem will be
discussed in turn.
1. The Transition Statute.
The prevailing method of handling the felony murder in the
United States today is to provide that a homicide committed in
the course of certain named felonies shall be murder, often in the
second degree. Thirteen states enumerate arson, rape, rob-
bery and burglary; other jurisdictions add mayhem, kidnappmg,
larceny, and some other felonies to the list. 1 So a statute embody-
mg the requisite of extreme danger and employing this tran-
sitional device of naming the felonies which shall be deemed
extremely dangerous in themselves might be worded:
61Moreland, The Law of Homicide 217 (1952).
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The unintentional killing of a human being is murder in the
second degree when committed by an act so extremely
dangerous as to constitute wanton indifference to human
life and safety The standard to be applied is that of a
reasonable man under the circumstances.
(a) The unintentional killing of a human being perpe-
trated in committing arson, rape, robbery or burglary shall
constitute murder in the second degree as the crime is
defined in this statute.
It will be immediately perceived that this statute embodies
the definition suggested for the negligent murder in the discussion
of that offense, supra, plus the additional transitional device of
naming four felonies in subsection (a) in the commission of
which, if a homicide occurs, the actor would be guilty of what
would amount to a negligent murder. Some of these felonies
might be omitted from the subsection; other felomes might be
added.
How would such a statute work? If a defendant committed a
homicide in the course of any felony other than those named, the
burden would be upon the prosecution to show that the particular
felony, under the circumstances, was so extremely dangerous in
itself as to show wantonly dangerous conduct upon the part of
the actor and that there was a causal connection between the
commission of the felony and the homicide. In other words the
prosecutor would have to meet exactly the same burden of
showing extremely dangerous conduct that he would have had to
meet if the act out of which the killing arose had not been a
felony But if the homicide arose out of one of the named
felonies there would be a conclusive presumption that the act
was extremely dangerous. Nevertheless the element of causation
would have to be satisfied.
The plan would be that in the course of time the transitional
called felony murder would be exactly the same. Ten, fifty, or
even more years might elapse before the transitional device could
be eliminated.
Such a statute would have the advantage of the decided
current frend in American statutes toward handling the felony
murder in this manner.6
62 Moreland, The Law of Honmecde 217-25 (1952).
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(2) The Felony Murder in the Model Penal Code of the
American Law Institute.
The Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute handles
the felony murder very similarly to the way suggested in the
transition statute in (a) above. In other words, the Model Code
combines the negligent and felony murders by providing a
definition of the negligent murder and then adding, in the same
section of the statute, an additional provision that the extreme
negligence required for the negligent murder shall be "presumed"
if the actor is engaged in any one of six named felomes. The
statute reads:
Cnmmal homicide constitutes murder when:
(b) It is committed recklessly under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.
Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if the
actor is engaged or is an accomplice m the commission of,
or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing robbery,
rape by force or intimidation, arson, burglary, kidnaping or
felomous escape.63
It will be perceived, however, that this statute differs from
the transition statute in (a) above in two particulars:
(i) The definition of the negligent murder employs the
word "recklessly" in defining the negligent murder. It is the
key word to be used in the definition of the negligent man-
slaughter, to be discussed rnfra. Judges and juries would find
it a matter of continuing difficulty to distinguish the negligence
requisite for the two offenses, if the same word were employed
to describe each, even though qualifying phrases were used. In
addition, it is not believed that the word connotes the utter
disregard or indifference for human life and safety requsite for
the negligent murder even though the phrase "under circum-
stances manifesting extreme indifference" is added. The study
group prefers instead to use the word wantonly as indicating
the utter disregard for the lives and safety of others which is
required.
(ii) The transition statute provides that if an unintentional
homicide arose out of and in the comnussion of one of the named
63Model Penal Code §201.2(b) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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felomes the actor would be guilty of a negligent murder. To state
it in another way, if the homicide occurred in the commission of
one of the named felonies there would be a conclusive presump-
tion that the killing arose out of an act so extremely dangerous as
to make the offense a negligent murder as defined by the statute.
The Model Code is less severe in that such extreme negligence
is merely presumed from the doing of the named felony and,
consequently, the presumption is rebuttable. That this is the
proper interpretation of the statute is indicated by the Comment
of those who drafted it: "If the presumption of extreme reckless-
ness is rebutted, the homicide may still be adjudged reckless, m
which event it constitutes manslaughter, as do all reckless homn-
cides whether the actors conduct is otherwise felomous or not."
(Emphasis added.)"
(3) English Homicide Act of 1957
The new English act abolishes the felony murder and some-
what changes murder by a killing arising out of resisting arrest
and related offenses. Pertinent sections of the act provide:
1. (1) Where a person kills another in the course or fur-
therance of some other offense, the killing shall not amount
to murder unless done with the same malice aforethought
(express or implied) as is required for a killing to amount
to murder when not done in the course or furtherance of
another offense.
(2) For the purposes of the foregoing subsection, a ldfl-
ing done in the course or for the purpose of resisting an
officer of justice, or of resisting or avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest, or of effecting or assisting an escape or rescue
from legal custody, shall be treated as a killing in the course
or furtherance of an offense. 5
Although the penalty for murder is prescribed by statute m
England, its definition prior to this statute has been entirely
dependent on the common law 6 Murder at common law is
unlawful homicide with malice aforethought. That remains the
definition of murder in England under this act. This requisite
malice aforethought can be either express or implied, a common
64 Model Penal Code §201.2, comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).6 5 Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11; see 202 H.L. Deb. 726 (5th ser.
1957).
66 Prevezer, The English Homicide Act: A New Attempt to Revise the Law of
Murder, 57 Col. L, Rev. 624 (1957).
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law classification continued in the act in Section 1 (1) Express
malice, a requisite of the intentional murder, 7 discussed supra,
is made out by showing an intent to kill or to do grievous bodily
harm. Implied malice can be made out by showing that the
unlawful killing arose out of the doing of an extremely dangerous
act, illustrated by the negligent murder,6 also discussed supra.
Both the common law intentional murder and common law
negligent murder are continued under the English act in section
1 (1)
But murder at common law may be categorized under two
additional applications of the doctrine of implied malice. One
of these is found in the felony murder, which is abolished in
section 1 (1) of the act. Hereafter in England there must be
shown the same implied malice (extreme negligence) which is
required when the killing is not done in the course or furtherance
of another offense. The other common law application of the doc-
trine of implied malice is found when the unlawful killing
occurs in resisting lawful arrest and certain other related ar-
rest situations. This category of murder is somewhat changed
in section 1(2) of the act.69 The extreme negligence required in
these cases will be treated as existing where the killing occurred
in resisting, avoiding, or preventing arrest.
The English act differs from both the transition statute
discussed in (1) supra and the felony murder provision in the
Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute discussed in
(2) Each of these continues to incorporate certain named
felomes in the negligent murder provision. The English act
goes the whole way; it abolishes the felony murder completely
and puts the affirmative burden on the Crown (state) to make
out a case of negligent murder in each case of implied malice,
except in the homicide in the course of arrest cases.
67 Id. at 625.
6s Id. at 625-26. Note the discussion therein of the English definition of the
negligent murder.
69 This category of murder is not discussed in tis paper. It has ceased to be
recognized. It is discussed at some length in Moreland, The Law of Homicide,
chs. 7 & 15 (1952). Moreland found only two or three statutory instances of its
survival and concluded that they are "ill-advised legislation." Id. at 227.
For a descnption of the four states of mind constituting malice aforethought,
express and implied, at common law see id. at 17 n.2. The book contains separate
chapter discussions of each state of mind.
70 For the English definition of negligent murder see supra note 68.
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Having examined the three modem, current ways of handling
the felony murder, the problem now arises of deciding how
this historic offense should be treated in a homicide statute
recommended for legislative action in Kentucky Should such a
statute utilize the transition statute, the felony murder provision
of the Model Code, recommend the elimination of the offense
completely as m the English Act, or even, perhaps, use some
fourth manner of treatment of the ancient crime?
It has been determined to follow the new English act and
recommend the complete abolishment of the doctrine. The
felony murder should be abolished because it is a historic survivor
for which there is no logical or practical basis for existence in
modem law 71 Judge Stephen put his finger on the fundamental
error in the doctrine when he decided in Regina v. Serne that
it was the amount of danger in the act rather than the fact that
it was an unlawful one that created liability for the homicide.72
The doctrine "was smuggled into the common law"7 3 at a time
when the punishment for all felonies was death by hanging, so it
made little difference whether the actor was hanged for the
felony or the homicide. The time has long since passed when
it should have been weeded out of the law The test has now
become, was the act in itself, regardless of its unlawfulness, so
extremely dangerous and indifferent to the lives and safety of
others as to constitute wantonly negligent conduct? Stating the
rule in tis manner throws such cases squarely into the negligent
murder category 74
The decision to abolish the felony murder, if followed, should
not change existing Kentucky law for any practical purpose.
Granting that the common law felony murder is recognized in
the state in one line of cases,75 the passage of ICRS 431.075
stopped the practicality of prosecution for the offense, because
the penalty for involuntary manslaughter is the same.
The thinking and reasoning up to this point as to the felony
murder would call for the abolishment of the offense from Ken-
71 Obio has abolished the felony murder. Note, 17 Ohio L.J. 130 (1956).
72 [1887] 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 311, 313.
73 Corcoran, Felony Murder Doctnne rn New York, 6 Fordham L. Rev. 43,53 (1937)..
74 Moreland, The Law of Homicide 50 (1952).
75 Text accompanying notes 58-60, supra.
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tucky law and the punishment of such a homicide under the new
statute, involuntary manslaughter in the first degree, passed by
the 1962 Legislature. However, the solution to the problem of
the felony murder in Kentucky is not as simple as that. This is
because the courts have created in this state the felony willful
murder. This decision-created offense, whose very name is a
contradiction in terms, will now be discussed.
The Felony Willful Murder
This impossible crime, comparable to that other impossible
unlawful homicide, the Kentucky negligent voluntary manslaugh-
ter, which was also created by the courts, is found in a line of
Kentucky decisions. However, it should be remembered that the
historical felony murder is an unintentional homicide. The killer
has implied malice, not express malice. With this well-known
historical principle in mind, the question arises as to how it was
possible for the Kentucky courts to turn an unintentional felony
murder into an intentional willful one punishable under KRS
435.010, a willful murder statute.
Nevertheless, there can be no question but that the doctrine
is in Kentucky decision law and that it runs far back in the
cases. 7  Nor can there be any mistake as to what is going on for
the opimons are explicit in their language. For example, the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals said in 1943:
The intent to perpetrate a different felony during the com-
mission of which a person is killed, supplies the elements of
malice and intent to murder although the death is actually
against the original intention of the party. Responsibility
for the consequence rests on the initial or contemplated
purpose. (Emphasis added.) 77
7 6 Roberson, New Kentucky Crimnal Law, Procedure and Forms §857 (2d
ed. 1927) (citing early cases). The reasoning in Roberson and in some of the
cases cited therein is exceedingly loose, Of course the common law untntentional
felony murder with implied malice is very old but to interpret this category of
murder in terms of express malice and intentional act is both ilogical and tech-
rucally unsound, no matter who does it. For example, Roberson quotes Hawkins
out of context as follows: "It is a general rule that whenever a man intending to
commit one felony hap pens to commit another, he is as much guilty as if he lad
intended the felony wich he actually commits." Ibnd. To interpret the second
felony in this quote in terms of intent is extremely dangerous and probably wrong
in more instances than right.
77 Simpson v. Commonwealth, 293 Ky. 631, 170 S.W.2d 869-70 (1943).
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A leading case in the unfortunate series is the well-known
recent one of Tarrence v. Commonwealth,"' decided about ten
years ago. In that case the Tarrences, father and son, killed a
Louisville lawyer who had been representing the wife of the
son in obtaining a divorce. The defendants abducted the lawyer,
a felony under KRS 485.150, and in the course of the abduction
killed him. The court considered that they were guilty of willful
murder under KRS 435.010. In the course of the opinion the
appellate court said.
[I] n this jurisdiction the usual form is an instruction that if
the accused committed or attempted to commit another
felony and in doing so killed a person, the jury should find
hun guilty of murder.79
Stanley on Instructions has an approved instruction, modeled
on a Kentucky case,80 which points up specifically and graphically
the present rule that in this state an unintentional homcide
occurring in the commlssion of a felony is willful murder. The
approved instruction reads as follows:
Sec. 870. Murder while committing another felony If
the jury shall believe from the evidence beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant, C. M., in this county and
before the finding of the indictment herein, unlawfully,
willfully, feloniously and maliciously, with an offensive
weapon, assaulted and attempted to hold up and rob the
truck in which the deceased, R. M., was riding, and with
the intention to rob said truck or any person thereon, and
that in doing so he willfully and feloniously shot at and into
the truck and thereby wounded and killed R. M., then you
should find the defendant, C. M., guilty of willful murder
and fix his punishment at death or confinement in the
penitentiary for life, in your discretion.8i
If the felony willful murder were abolished, the problem
would anse as to what principle should then govern the prosecu-
78 265 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1953); accord, Centers v. Commonwealth, 318 S.W.2d
57 (Ky. 1958); Page v. Commonwealth, 317 S.W.2d 879 (Ky. 1958); Whitfield
v. Commonwealth, 278 Ky. 111, 128 S.W.2d 208 (1939); Marion v. Common-
wealth, 269 Ky. 729, 108 S.W.2d 721 (1987); Williams v. Commonwealth, 258
Ky. 830, 81 S.W.2d 891 (1935); Reddick v. Commonwealth, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 1020,
33 S.W 416 (Ct. App. 1895).
71 265 S.W.2d at 51. The court is speaking here of willful murder under
KRS 435.010.80 Maxey v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 330, 74 S.W.2d 336 (1934).
81 Stanley, Instructions to Juries §870 (1940).
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ton of such cases. As stated above, it is believed that such of-
fenses should be prosecuted and punished as involuntary man-
slaughter in the first degree under the new involuntary man-
slaughter statute passed by the 1962 Legislature. That proposi-
tion will be developed in the discussion of that statute later in
this paper.
II. MANSAUGRm
A. Voluntary (intentional) manslaughter
Any discussion of voluntary manslaughter should begin with
the specific statement that voluntary manslaughter is an unlawful
intentional killing. The very word voluntary indicates that.
The question then immediately arises, why are not such homicides
punished as murder? It is in answering and rationalizing the
answer to that question that a discussion of this crime centers.
From early times the punishment for certain intentional
unlawful homicides has been reduced to manslaughter because
of extenuating circumstances. The primary problem, then, in a
discussion of voluntary manslaughter is to determine what
exceptional circumstances have been accepted by the law as
]ustifyimg such a reduction and to make a determination as to
whether the same circumstances should serve as reducing agents
today
(a) Provocation.
The law has long recognized that such provocation as might
raise heat of passion in a reasonable man may serve as a
mitigating agent to reduce an mtentional unlawful homicide to
voluntary manslaughter. Such mitigation, it is said, is buttressed
upon "a thorough knowledge of the human heart, and framed in
compassion to the passions and frailties which belong to and are
inseparable from our natures." z2 A reasonable man should not
commit an unlawful killing because of provocation. But reason-
able men do occasionally become filled with heat of passion
because of provocation, and then kill. The law takes cognizance of
tis fact. Technically the law might be that since such homicides
are intentional, and not excusable or justifiable, the offense is
82 State v. Ferguson, 20 S.C. (2 Hill) 619, 622 (1835); Foster, Crown Law
296 (2d ed. 1791); 1 Russell, Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanors 513 (7th
Amencan ed.).
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murder. On the other hand, the law might make such homicides
wholly excusable because of the mitigating circumstances. The
law does neither. As a matter of social policy, the law com-
promises with the defendant in this instance, splitting the
difference, as it were, between intentional murder and excusable
homicide. While a reasonable man should not be punished for
murder when he kills under provocation, neither should he go
scot free. The law adopts an rn-between position and holds him
for voluntary manslaughter8 3 if, in fact, he was filled with heat of
passion. 4
The law has long recognized the following four situations as
sufficient to raise such heat of passion in a reasonable man as to
justify letting them serve as mitigating agents in cases of in-
tentional killing: (1) sudden, mutual combat, (2) the sight of
adultery of one's wife, (3) an assault and battery upon one's
person, and (4) an illegal arrest.8 5 There are Kentucky decisions
that sudden, mutual combat, 6 the sight of adultery of one's wife,17
and an assault and battery upon one s person 8 may constitute
sufficient provocation to reduce what would otherwise be an
intentional murder to voluntary (intentional) manslaughter.
Whether an illegal arrest by an officer will serve as provocation
in Kentucky is doubtful.89 It is believed that the common law
and majority rule that an illegal arrest may serve as provocation
is the better one. While one should not kill to prevent an illegal
arrest, nothing raises greater heat of passing in the breast of a
reasonable liberty-loving person, and the law does well to
mitigate the offense and the punishment for one whose emotions
83Moreland, The Law of Homicide 67 (1952).
84 The test of provocation is an objective one (the reasonable man) but if mn
fact the defendant, subjectively speaking was not flled with heat of passion there
is no reduction. So the law catches the defendant coming and going. E.g., David-
son v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 451, 187 S.E. 437 (1936).85 For a detailed discussion of these four situations which may serve as
provocation, see Moreland, The Law of Homicide 69-87 (1952).86 Hanna v. Commonwealth, 242 Ky. 584, 46 S.W.2d 1098 (1932); Roberson,
op. cit. supra note 76 §383; Gregory, op. cit. supra note 44, §86.87 Hams v. Commonwealth, 236 Ky. 666, 33 S.W.2d 666 (1930) (dictum);
Roberson, op. cit. supra note 76 §389.88 Wliams v. Commonwealth, 80 Ky. 313 (1882); Roberson, op. cit. supra
note 76, §384.89 Alsop v. Commonwealth, 4 Ky. L. Rep. 547, 11 Ky. Op. 851 (Ct. App.1882) (fflegal arrest would not reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter); see
Dickey, Culpable Hoimctde i Resisting Arrest, 18 Corn. L.Q. 373 n.O (1933).
But see Wright v. Commonwealth, 85 Ky. 123, 2 S.W 904 (1887) (illegal arrest
by private person) (defense of ones habitation).
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are so sorely pressed that he does kill because of the heat of
passion engendered by the unlawful arrest 0
It is commonly said that cases of intentional unlawful killing
are reduced to voluntary manslaughter, if at all, by provocationY1
However, this is an maccurate statement. As several writers have
pointed out, there are a number of cases holding that there are a
few situations where a defendant may be convicted of voluntary
manslaughter because of an extenuating circumstance other than
provocation. In other words the provocation category is too
narrow to encompass all the cases of voluntary manslaughter.
Among the extenuating circumstances, other than provocation,
which may reduce an intentional homicide to voluntary man-
slaughter are: (1) situations involving an imperfect defense of
self or of another person, or of habitation, (2) the mental
deficiency of the accused,92 and (3) drunkenness.
(b) Situations of imperfect defense of self, of another person,
or of habitation, and some similar situations.
Situations of "imperfect" defense of self, of another, or of
habitation occur where the defendant would be entitled to plead
self-defense, or defense of another person or habitation if he had
not been at fault in bringing on the difficulty which resulted in
the homicide. If he were permitted to plead self-defense or
defense of another or of habitation he would be guilty of no
crine;94 since he was at fault in bringing on the difficulty, he is
dened the right to a perfect defense. But instead of being guilty
of murder because of the intentional killing the law compromises
by holding him guilty of voluntary manslaughter only, as hap-
pened in a case where the accused was caught in the act of
adultery and killed the husband to save his own life.'5 Similar
to the imperfect self-defense cases are those in which the slayer
erroneously and unreasonably believed that his life or the life of
another was in danger, or in which the accused used greater
90See generally Moreland, The Law of Homicide 77-82 (1952); Dickey,
supra note 89, at 387.90 Note, 36 Ky. L.J. 482 (1948).9 2 Compare Arnett Mann s categorization, Note, 36 Ky. L.J. 443, 452-53
(1948).93 See generally notes 101-26, nfa, and accompanying text.94 White v. Commonwealth, 333 S.W.2d 521 (Ky. 1960).05 Reed v. State, 11 Tex. App. 509 (1892); see Roberson, op. cit. supra note
76, §537.
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force than was reasonably necessary 96 Some of these cases
expressly state that heat of passion is not always necessary to
make out the offense of voluntary manslaughter.
(c) Mental deficiency not amounting to legal insanity.
Similarly, mental deficiency, not amounting to legal insanity,
without heat of passion may reduce an intentional unlawful
homicide to voluntary manslaughter. This category has not been
accepted to any large extent but there is authority for it in
several states, including Kentucky, and its logic is persuasive.
There are several Kentucky cases subscribing to the mitigating
influence of the rule of diminished responsibility because of
mental deficiency In Mangrum v. Commonwealth, the court
affirmed a conviction of voluntary manslaughter based upon an
instruction that the jury should acquit the defendant if they
should believe him insane or "if they [should] believe from the
evidence that he was of weak or feeble mind, they should consider
that fact in determining the degree of his guilt and the measure
of his pumshment."97 Similarly, in Rogers v. Commonwealth,8
the Kentucky court reversed a conviction of murder, holding that
the accused was entitled to an instruction on voluntary man-
slaughter. The court said that the mental condition of the
defendant, "whether feeble-minded or otherwise," was a factor to
be taken into consideration by the jury in determining whether
the malice requisite for murder existed at the time of the homi-
cide.
It should be emphasized that mental deficiency as a mitigating
influence should be sparngly and conservatively administered.
There is much flux presently in the law as to the legal defense
of insanity which is a complete defense to a crime. Most states
still subscribe to the rule in McNaughten's Case.9 9 About one-
third of the American states, including Kentucky, add to that
rule the further amelioration of rresistable inpulse.100 But many
persons think the legal test of insanity still too severe. For such
persons, mental deficiency which does not excuse the crime, as
96 See 2 Burdick, Law of Crme §461 (1946); note, 36 Ky. L.J. 443, 447
(1948); Note, 37 Ky. L.J. 334, 337 (1949).
97 19 Ky. L. Rep. 94, 95, 39 S.W 703, 704 (Ct. App. 1897).
9896 Ky. 24, 27 S.W 818 (1894).
99 Moreland, The Law of Honcide 276 & n.31 (1952).1o Id. at 283 & n.56.
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does legal insanity, but only reduces it, serves as an experimental
means of softening the legal insanity rule. But this new extension
in the law should be carefully and conservatively applied, else it
will gain disfavor and its purpose be defeated.
(d) The Use of Drunkenness to Reduce Willful (Intentional)
Murder to Voluntary Manslaughter
Under the strict, usual enunciation of the common law rule,
drunkenness was no defense to cinme. However, if an accused
were too drunk to formulate a specific intent, a prosecution for a
crime requiring specific intent would fail.10 1 Murder, for instance,
could not be reduced to manslaughter for the sole reason that the
accused was drunk. This remains the rule in some jurisdictions.0 2
However, today in some states having statutes distinguishing
different degrees of a specified crine, for example where first
degree murder requires premeditation, intoxication may rduce
a charge of first degree murder to murder in the second degree.
The theory is that the intoxication may be so great as to
prevent the accused from having the premeditation required for
the higher offense.0 3 This is reasonably logical and no particular
deviation, it may be argued, from the general rule since it may
be said that the accused is too drunk to form the grade of intent
(premeditation) requisite for the higher crime. This is certainly
true as to those grades of second degree murder requiring only
general intent as opposed to actual or specific intent, such as the
negligent murder, but it is arguable that it is also true where
simple intent, rather than general intent, is required for second
degree murder, for it may be argued (but less forceably) that
simple intent requires less specificness than premeditation.
But the argument becomes even less logical and persuasive
when drunkenness is used to reduce a charge of willful (in-
tentional) murder to voluntary manslaughter. And yet it is a fact
in quite a number of jurisdictions that the drunkenness of the
accused may operate to reduce intentional murder to voluntary
manslaughter. The contention that the intent requisite for willful
murder is more specific than the intent required for voluntary
manslaughter is fallacious, it may be argued, and wholly outside
30 1 Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Beard, [1920] A.C. 479.
102 1 Burdick, Law of Crnme §169 (1946).
103 1bid.
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the historic reasoning that supports the voluntary manslaughter
category m the law of homicide. It is often said that intentional
unlawful homicide is reduced to voluntary manslaughter upon a
rationalization of mitigation, not lack of an ability to make out
the intent requisite for intentional murder. To state it differently,
voluntary manslaughter as it developed historically was an unlaw-
ful homicide resulting from an intention to kill or to do grievous
bodily harm and consequently would have been murder, except
for some sort of extenuating circumstance.
So, to reduce a willful (intentional)"' killing because the volun-
tary drunkenness of the accused made it impossible for him to
have the willfulness requisite for the higher crime of murder
creates a decided departure in the rationale of voluntary man-
slaughter. There is also the additional fact that it is difficult to
substantiate an argument that the intent required for willful
murder is any different in degree or kind from the intent requisite
for voluntary (willful) manslaughter The word voluntary means
no more and no less than the killing was willful (intentional)
It is submitted that there are no degrees of willfulness, unless the
concept is made more specific by some additional requisite such
as deliberation or premeditation. This additional requisite is
not found in the case of willful murder.
And yet the fact remains that there is a considerable number
of cases where under modem statutes a willful (intentional)
unlawful killing has been reduced to voluntary (willful) man-
slaughter because of drunkenness. Such decisions may be found
in England, in Kentucky, and in various other ]urisdictions. A
number of them will be examined and a determination made as
to whether they represent a wise social policy If it is determined
that they do, an attempt will be made to fit them into accepted
principles and it will be decided whether a reduction for this
reason should be incorporated in the suggested Homicide Act.
(1) Situation in England.
The fact that in England drunkenness may reduce an inten-
tional (willful) killing to voluntary manslaughter is recognized by
Kenny in his discussion of provocation as a reducing agent. He
10 4 The word willful rather -than intentional is used because KRS 435.010
uses the word "willful" rather than intentional.
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points out that the accused will not have his crime reduced
because he is more sensitive and more susceptible to heat of
passion than ordinary men, but that there are cases where because
of the temporary effect of alcohol the accused was rendered more
inflammable than an ordinary man and this has reduced the
offense. Apparently he considers this reduction to fall within the
category of provocation.1 5 He concludes that "such uncertainty
is a defect m any branch of a legal system."106 He then adds that
the Homicide Act of 1957 has made some changes, apparently
with the hope that it will clarify the situation, but the study
group is unable to find anything in the act which might justify
such wish. It may be stated that Kenny considers such reduc-
tion because of drunkenness as having another possible explana-
tion, that drunkenness may create an inability in the accused
to form the intent requisite for intentional murder. 07 These are
the two possible explanations commonly given for the reduction.
Neither is very satisfactory from a technical standpoint.
To support the position that drunkenness may serve as pro-
vocation m such cases to reduce the offense to manslaughter,
Kenny cites R. v. Hooper'08 and R. v. Letenock.10 9
(2) Kentucky Cases.
The proposition that drunkenness may serve to reduce willful
murder to voluntary manslaughter has been given credence in
several Kentucky cases and in Gregory's text on Kentucky
criminal law 110 In Long v. Commonwealth"' the court held that
an instruction on voluntary manslaughter should have been given.
Part of the reason for the holding was the fact of the defendant's
drunkenness which the court held might have served to reduce
the offense from willful murder. The court cited Gregory in
support of the holding. In a subsequent Kentucky case, Lee v.
Commonwealth,"2 the appellate court held that "drunkenness
may show an absence of malice. Although it does not excuse the
105 Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law 60 (17th ed. 1951).
106 Ibid.
107 Id. at 59.
108 [19151 2 K.B. 431.
109 [1917] 12 Crim. App. B. 221.
110 Gregory,' Kentucky Criminal Law, Procedure and Forms §94 (1918).
111'262 SW.2d 809 (Ky. 1953).
112 329 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1959). See also Jones v. Commonwealth, 311 S.W.2d
190 (Ky. 1958); Pash v. Commonwealth, 146 Ky. 390, 142 S.W 700 (1912).
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crime, intoxication of a defendant may be considered in determm-
nag the degree of the homcide."-"3 This case follows the
rationalization that drunkenness may prevent the accused from
having the type of willfulness (malice) requisite for murder,
although he will still be guilty of willful (voluntary) man-
slaughter. The Lee case cites a much earlier Kentucky case,
Henderson v. Commonwealth,"4 which states that it is competent
to prove drunkenness as bearing merely upon the existence or
non-existence of malice. The case specifically states that drunken-
ness cannot mitigate the offense but can only be used to show
that the accused could not be guilty of murder because unable
to form the malice requisite for the higher crime. This case
definitely repudiates the theory that such cases fall into the
category of provocation. It would therefore appear that Kentucky
follows the view that drunkenness may reduce a willful murder to
voluntary manslaughter because it may serve to prevent the
accused from being able to form the willfulness (intent) requisite
for the higher offense.
(3) Decisions in other states.
Decisions to the effect that drunkenness may reduce inten-
tional murder to voluntary manslaughter may also be found in
other states. Supporting the theory that the drunkenness of the
accused may prevent him from forming the malice (intent)
requisite for murder and thus reduce the offense to manslaughter
are the 1952 Alabama case, Ray v. State,"5 and State v. Sprouse,"'
an Idaho case decided in 1941. Other cases are to the same
effect.1 7 Cases supporting the theory that drunkenness may
cause the accused to be more susceptable to provocation than a
sober man and so reduce the offense may also be found.1' 8
It may be concluded then that, while there are cases to the
contrary, there are decisions in England, in Kentucky and in
certain other states subscribing to the proposition that drunken-
ness may serve to reduce an intentional (willful) murder to
313 829 S.W.2d at 60.
1424 Ky. L. Rep. 1985, 72 S.W 781 (Ct. App. 1903).
115 257 Ala. 418, 59 So. 2d 582 (1952).
116 63 Idaho 166, 118 P.2d 378 (1941).
117Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 182 n.23 (1954); 1
Burdick, Law of Crime 218 n.82 (1946).
118 1 Burdick, Law of Crine 218 n.33 (1946).
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voluntary manslaughter. It may be further concluded that such
decisions rest upon two rationalizations: (1) that drunkenness
may prevent the accused from forming the higher degree of
intent (malice) requisite for murder, and (2) that because of
the temporary effect of alcohol the mind of the accused may be
rendered more inflammable than the mind of an ordinary person
would be and so more readily full of heat of passion. This reason-
ing causes such cases to fall into the provocation category
It must be admitted that neither of these explanations for
reduction because of drunkenness is very satisfactory To say
that drunkenness may prevent the accused from forming the
higher grade or degree of intent (willfulness) requisite for
murder by interpreting it in terms of the outmoded word
malice, and so reduce the offense to intentional (voluntary)
manslaughter is to say, in a sense, that intention is divisible into
degrees. Historically, murder required malice aforethought. Man-
slaughter was unlawful homicide without malice aforethought.
Then the intention factor was a real difference between inten-
tional murder and intentional manslaughter. But aforethought
is no longer a factor in simple intentional (willful) murder. So, it
is submitted, it is strained reasoning to say that a higher degree
of intent is required for intentional murder than for intentional
(voluntary) manslaughter. And yet a sense of justice makes the
argument that a higher degree of intention (willfulness) is re-
quired for murder than for manslaughter somewhat persuasive.
The explanation that such reduction falls into the provocation
may create a situation where the mind is more easily inflamed
than that of an ordinary man would be and so he might have
heat of passion in a situation where the mnmd of a sober man
would not be inflamed. But the law has always taken a harsh
attitude toward drunkenness as a defense since the condition
was caused by the drunkard's own voluntary act. His condi-
tion was due to his own fault. Consequently, it may be argued
that there is the cold practical fact that to reduce because of
drunkenness would cause a great many accused persons to escape
proper liability for their crimes.
And yet there is accepted precedent for the reduction of a
willful killing, although the killer was originally at fault, in the
old provocation category of sudden, mutual combat (sudden
KENTucKy LAW JOTJBNAL[
affray) "' Two men meet and A makes a slanderous statement
or does some other unlawful act like leading with his sword. If
B, the other person involved, shows that he wants to fight and to
engage in mutual combat but is killed in the encounter, A's
original unlawful act is not apt to prevent him from having his
offense reduced to voluntary manslaughter on the doctrine of
provocation.
Another illustration of the fact that there is accepted pre-
cedent for the reduction of an intended killing, although the
killer was originally at fault, is found m the histonc doctrine of
imperfect self-defense. A defendant is caught by a husband in
the act of adultery with his wife. The adulterer kills the husband
in self-defense. He is not permitted to plead perfect self-defense
but his fault in bringing on the situation will not prevent him
from having his offense reduced to voluntary manslaughter in
imperfect self-defense. Incidentally, cases of imperfect self-de-
fense are not in the provocation category They represent a
separate category If fault in bringing on the situation will not
prevent the reduction in these cases why should it prevent the
reduction in situations of voluntary drunkenness? 120
There is also a rather strong argument for reduction on
the ground that the drinking of intoxicating liquor is one of the
common frailties of man. The whole doctrine of provocation,
the original basis for reduction, is built upon a recognition
of man s frailty and of a desire of the law to show mercy in
certain situations by permitting a reduction of the offense. It may
well be argued that drunkenness is one of the situations that
should fit into such a scheme of reduction.
As a matter of fact, however, the issue as to whether drunken-
ness should serve to reduce willful murder to voluntary man-
slaughter does not have to be faced in drafting the proposed
Kentucky Homicide Act. There is no compelling reason for
119 Moreland, The Law of Honucide 69 (1952).
120 It is interesting that one member of the study group suggests that an
accused may have been too drunk to form intent. So lie should (techically)
be excused of the homicide because the state cannot make out a case (of either
murder or voluntary manslaughter). But, as in imperfect self-defense, the law will
not excuse hun altogether and so comproises by making it voluntary man-
slaughter. It is believed that this rationalization is better than either of the two
found in the cases. Such reasoning would make a separate category of drunkenness
as a reducing agent. The only trouble with it is that the courts do not use it;
such reasoning is not found in the cases.
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incorporating it. If it is desirable to permit drunkenness to serve
as a reducing agent, there is a basis for it under either of the
explanations for the doctrine without incorporating the proposi-
tion specifically in the proposed act. If the courts desire to give
credence to the doctrine under the theory that reduction because
of drunkenness is reduction because of provocation, the general
provision incorporating the common law definition of provoca-
tion, which is recommended in the act, may be seized upon.
If, as in past Kentucky decisions, it is desired to rationalize the
reduction as based upon the Commonwealth's inability to make
out the intention (willfulness) requsite for murder, Kentucky
precedents and accepted legal principles already exist which
support that proposition. On the other hand, if it were deemed
wise to repudiate such a reduction, a negative provision in the
act specifically repudiating the proposition would seem to be
most unwise in the face of several Kentucky decisions accept-
ing it and the fact that it has a certain amount of persuasiveness
as a matter of public policy So in either view the proposition
need not be mentioned in the proposed act unless it be for the
purpose of making the law more clear and explicit by codifying
the various factors which will reduce intentional (willful) murder
to voluntary manslaughter.
(e) Is there a conflict in the use of Mental Deficiency and
Drunkenness in reducing murder to voluntary manslaugh-
ter?
The question arises whether there is a conflict between the
use of mental deficiency not amounting to legal insanity, as
categorized in section (c) of this discussion, and drunkenness, in
section (d), as factors reducing murder to voluntary manslaugh-
ter. The study group takes the position that there is no clash or
conflict in using these two reducing agents.
Kentucky, which has used both of these agents on occasion to
reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter, will be used to illus-
trate the point. Mangrum v. Commonwealth12' and Rogers v.
Commonwealth,122 which used the mental deficiency of the ac-
cused not amounting to legal insanity to reduce the offense to
121 19 Ky. L. Rep. 94, 95, 39 S.W 708, 704 (Ct. App. 1897).
12296 Ky. 24, 27 S.W 813 (1894).
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voluntary manslaughter, contained no element of drunkenness, so
they are not helpful on the problem.
A third case, Horn v. Commonwealth,'" is of help on the
problem although the case is one in which it was alleged that the
defendant had delirium tremens. Delirium tremens is a form of
legal insanity. Cases of mental deficiency, the type of mental
disorder under consideration, are less than legal insanity, it should
be pointed out, so the case is not exactly m point. However,
Judge Thomas held that as the case involved alleged drunkenness
and mental disorder it was proper to give an instruction on
voluntary manslaughter on the facts disclosed in the record "on
the ground that defendant's condition, howsoever produced, may
have been such as to deprive him of the necessary element of
malice or malice aforethought essential to create the crime of
murder."124 This case seems to furnish the answer to the problem
of the relation of drunkenness and mental deficiency as agents to
reduce willful murder to voluntary manslaughter. There are cases
holding that each may serve as such reducing agent in Kentucky
If both are involved in a particular case, each can be submitted
to the jury for them to determine whether the offense should be
reduced. The only question is whether a separate instruction
should be given as to each or whether one instruction on volun-
tary manslaughter is sufficient. The Horn case is one where one
instruction on voluntary manslaughter was given and the convic-
tion of voluntary manslaughter was affirmed.
It is believed that this is proper, for as Judge Thomas said:
the question is whether defendant's condition "however pro-
duced" 25 was such as to keep hin from having the malice
requisite for murder. It is the position of the study group that
under such a single instruction the jury might correctly find the
offense reduced by drunkenness, by mental deficiency, or by a
combination of the two.'26  The presence of either will not
123 167 S.W.2d 58 (Ky. 1948).
124 Id. at 61.
125 Thd.
12 "Where the defense relies on the consequential effect of intoxication on a
mind already mentally disordered, the defendant is entitled to have this clearly
presented mn the charge, and it is error to state the law on insanity and the law on
intoxication separately.' Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 125(1954) (citing cases pro and con). It is believed that the Horn case supports the
statement and represents the Kentucky view.
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prevent the other from reducing. Thus, there is no conflict or
clash between drunkenness and mental deficiency as reducing
agents; they may operate independently to reduce or not to
reduce, or a combination of the two may serve to reduce, or not
to reduce, depending upon the finding by the jury
(f) The Kentucky negligent voluntary manslaughter
It becomes necessary at this point to discuss the negligent
voluntary manslaughter, the impossible crime practically un-
known in other jurisdictions. 27 It got into Kentucky criminal law
m the following manner. As mentioned earlier in this study,
there are two lines of decisions in this state, one line recognizing
the common law negligent murder, the other repudiating it.128
Those who refused to recognize the negligent murder diverted
those homicides to the lower level of manslaughter. But common
law involuntary manslaughter by gross negligence was retained;
the negligent murder became the new offense of negligent volun-
tary manslaughter, pumshable under KRS 435.020. Several things
contributed to the reasoning behind such a departure. One was
the faulty reasoning that one intends the natural consequences
of his acts. It is true that such a proposition, somewhat shaky at
its best, is found in homicide on the intentional murder level.
Note that the proposition itself states: one intends. The propo-
sition should not be used unless the homicidal result is "prac-
tically or substantially certain." 29 For example, one who shoots
into a crowd of people may be convicted of intentional murder
because it is substantially certain that he will kill or grievously
wound somebody in such a compact group. But negligence is
never intent; the dangerous act may be intended but the result of
the negligent act is never intended. If it is, the offense is intended
homicide, not homicide by negligence. So this proposition as to
intending natural and probable consequences should not apply
127 However, unfortunately, it is not wholly unknown. Alabama, for example,
has a statute defining manslaughter in the first degree as "Manslaughter by
voluntarily deprving a human being of life." Ala. Code Ann. tit. 14, §320 (1958).
A wanton killing is a voluntary killing within the definition of manslaughter in
that statute. A positive intent to kill is not necessary. The statute is satisfied if
the defendant does an act greatly dangerous to the lives of others whereby death
ensues. Ramey v. State, 245 Ala. 458, 17 So. 2d 687. Gills v. State, 35 Ala. App.
119, 45 So. 2d 44; Clayton v. State, 36 Ala. App. 175, 54 So. 2d 719.
128 Pp. 71-72 supra.
129 Moreland, The Law of Homicide 18-19 (1952).
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to negligence. Negligence is always dangerous conduct and
shows probable danger but never ntent, so it can never result in
a voluntary (intentional) manslaughter.
It is also possible that a certain amount of social policy entered
into the creation of tbis impossible Kentucky crime, the negligent
voluntary manslaughter. At that time the punishment for all
murder, common law and statutory, was life or death. Both of
these are severe. Juries are often loth to give such a severe
punishment for a negligent homicide. The next choice available
to those who desired to do away with the common law negligent
murder was involuntary manslaughter by negligence, a common
law offense in Kentucky for which the punishment may have
been considered too small for killing by negligence on the murder
level. The punishment for voluntary manslaughter in Kentucky
is from two to twenty-one years,'3 0 a wide span offering an ad-
justment of the punishment to the circumstances. So it was quite
practical to divert such common law negligent murders to the
voluntary manslaughter category The technical fact that negli-
gent homicide is never voluntary (intentional) was disregarded.
Finally the common law offense of negligent murder was com-
pletely killed off for all practical purposes by KRS 481.075, which
limits the punishment for all common law crimes not specifically
provided for by statute to imprisonment for a term not exceeding
twelve months or a fine not exceeding 5,000 dollars or both.
But whatever the cause or the reasoning for creating the
negligent voluntary manslaughter it is firmly entrenched m the
decision law of Kentucky One of the leading older cases
supporting the preposterous negligent voluntary manslaughter
and indicating the court's confusion as to the techmcalities of the
situation, as well as its loose use of adjectives which are not
synonyms to describe the offense, is Ewing v. Commonwealth
in which the court said:
When we reject the doctrine of implied malice, the issue
of malice is a question for the jury, and the offense which
would otherwise be murder becomes voluntary manslaugh-
ter, where under the evidence the jury find as a fact that
the killing was done with malice aforethought. Accord-
mgly it has been held m Kentucky in a long line of cases
10 KItS 435.020,
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that, where one kills another by the wanton, reckless, or
grossly careless use of firearms, the offense, if without
malice aforethought, is voluntary manslaughter, although
he had no intention.131
A current illustration of the illogical, confused and generally
undesirable situation which the negligent voluntary manslaughter
has led to in a long line of ambiguous decisions is found in Marye
v. Commonwealth.132 There a highly respected appellate judge,
in reversing the case for error in the instructions on involuntary
manslaughter by negligence, laid down the instructions-and cor-
rectly, it is submitted, in the light of Kentucky decisions-to be
given in the subsequent trial of the case. The judge stated that
at the new trial the instruction on voluntary (negligent) man-
slaughter should require a finding of reckless and wanton
conduct and that the instruction on involuntary manslaughter
(by negligence) should require a finding of gross negligence.
Gross negligence he defined as a failure to exercise slight care,
but he pointed out that more than ordinary negligence was
required in a criminal case. Two editorials in the Lexington
Leader 33 were extremely critical of the existing law as laid down
in the Marye case, pointing out that one can exercise slight
care by having one hand on the steering wheel of an automobile
and one foot within reaching distance of the brake pedal. The
editorials stated that the Legislature owed it to the people of
Kentucky to give them more protection. This the Legislature did,
under the leadership of Senator Richard Moloney of Lexington,
passing KRS 435.025, which makes it a crime to kill by the
negligent operation of an automobile. The Court of Appeals has
held in several cases that this statute is satisfied by ordinary
negligence. 134
As a result of the creation of the negligent, voluntary man-
slaughter, there now exists in Kentucky an impossible substantive
crime, since it is impossible to link negligence and intention. In
addition, ambiguous adjectives have been used, sometimes in one
combination, sometimes in another, to describe the crime. For
13 IEwmg v. Commonwealth, 129 Ky. 237, 111 S.W 352 (1908) (citing
other Kentucky cases).
132 240 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1951).
1S3 Lexington Leader, Oct. 26, 1951, p. 4; id., Nov. 13, 1951, P. 4.
184 E.g., Kelly v. Commonwealth, 267 S.W.2d 536 (1954).
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example, the court used "wanton, reckless, and grossly careless"
m the Ewing case to describe the offense, 3 5 terms which are by
no means synonyms. The Marye case eliminated the phrase
grossly careless from the enumeration but the current trend is
away from linking wanton and reckless m describing the same
degree of crimmal negligence.
The situation as to description is still worse on the level of
involuntary manslaughter. Courts today m states other than
Kentucky no longer use gross negligence to define the negligence
required for involuntary manslaughter; they use the word reckless,
a word pre-empted in Kentucky by the negligent voluntary man-
slaughter. Worse still is the definition of the outmoded phrase
gross negligence as want of slight care. Want of slight care is
practically no care. The situation under existing law is intolerable.
And yet the judge who wrote the opinion in the Marye case
is not to be criticised; he stated the law as it exists m Kentucky
backed by a long line of decisions. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals is also not to be criticised for the current situation,
because the law does give credence to stare decisis. It is believed
that as to negligence the law in Kentucky is so illogical, confused,
and ambiguous and the errors are of such long standing that no
particular judge, nor the appellate court itself, can straighten out
the situation without legislative aid.136
(g) Current extension in the law as to provocation.
Let us turn now, rather abruptly, to a current development
in the law of voluntary manslaughter. It relates to provocation
as a reducing agent. For several hundred years the law as to
provocation did not change. It is true that an occasional sport
case disturbed the equilibrium of the law but such decisions
caused little, if any, change in the stated categorization of four,
and only four, situations 37 which could serve as mitigating agents
to reduce intentional, unlawful killings to voluntary manslaughter.
Now suddenly an important development as to provocation is
found in both the new English Homicide Act of 1957 and the
current Model Penal Code.
135 Note 131 supra and accompanying text.
136 This situation occasioned the new involuntary manslaughter statute passed
by the 1962 Legislature.
137 p. 86 supra.
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Section 3 of the new English Homicide Act provides:
3. Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which
the jury can find that the person charged was provoked
(whether by things done or by things said or by both
together) to lose his self-control, the question whether the
provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as
he did shall be left to be determined by the jury; and in
determining that question the jury shall take into account
everything both done and said according to the effect
which, in their opinion, it would have on a reasonable
man.138
Kenny, the leading elementary authority on English criminal
law, points out that the effect of this provision is to change
provocation, which was formerly a question of both law and
fact,139 into a question of fact 4 ° for the jury In other words the
judge formerly defined provocation as a matter of law and the
jury applied the law to the facts. The law had seldom been
extended much, if any, beyond the original four situations
recognized as constituting provocation at common law Thus
the law remained that insulting words, no matter how oppro-
brious, would not serve as provocation to reduce an intentional
killing to voluntary manslaughter. 41 The test remains objective
under section 3 of the new act. But the jury is asked to determine
whether as a fact the circumstances in the particular case (things
done or things said or both taken together) were sufficient to
provoke a reasonable man "to lose his self-control." It is as simple
as that. But the results will be far-reaching and the limits of
provocation are bound to be increased much under the new law
For example, English reports will almost immediately reveal
decisions in which juries have found that words alone, or coupled
with other circumstances, have constituted provocation m par-
ticular cases.
On this side of the water the Model Penal Code has a
similar provision as to provocation. It provides that a criminal
homicide constitutes manslaughter when:
138 Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11; see H.L. Deb. 726 (5th ser.
1957).
139 Kenny, Outline of Crminal Law §119 at 156 (17th ed. 1958).
140 Id. §120, at 157.
141Id. §120, at 155-56.
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(b) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is com-
mitted under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or
excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse
shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person m the
actor s situation under the circumstances as he believes them
to be.142
The first question that occurs is the relation of the Model Code
provision to the one in the new English Homicide Act. They are
worded somewhat differently and it is believed that the English
provision is more clearly and definitely phrased. The question is,
would they be interpreted to mean the same thing?
The Comment to the Model Code provision correctly states
that the law as to what constitutes "adequate provocation" is
"substantially enlarged" 143 by the American provision. The Model
Code also provides that "the reasonabelness of such explanation
or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person
in the actor s situation under the circumstances as he believes
them to be." Under the circumstances as who believes them
to be? The answer to this question depends upon the antecedent
of the pronoun he. Is it "person" or is it "actor"? It is sub-
mitted that it is "actor," which gives the test a subjective twist.
If it were "person" the test would be wholly objective, under the
circumstances as a reasonable person would have believed them
to be.
The comment to the Model Code provision indicates that the
antecedent of "he" is "actor," not "person." The Comment states
that the recommended provision introduces a 'larger element of
subjectivity in the appraisal." It is submitted that this deviation
toward subjectivity is unfortunate. It is, however, tempered
somewhat by the statement in the Comment that only the actors
"situation" and the "circumstances as he sees them," not his
scheme of moral values, are to be considered. The test should
be not what the actor saw or felt under the circumstances but
what a reasonable man placed in the same situation would have
seen or felt. The test should be wholly objective. The English
Act and the discussion in Kenny T14 clearly take this position.
142 Model Penal Code §203(1)(b) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
143 Model Penal Code §203(1)(b), comment at 41 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959).
144 Kenny, op. cit. supra note 189, §§ 119-20.
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The question of adequacy of provocation under the English Act
is wholly a question of fact for the reasonable men who compose
the jury
An objection to the use of the word "excuse" may also be made
to the Model Code provision on provocation. An "excuse," of
which self-defense is the leading example, has long been recog-
nized as wholly absolving the accused of the crime. Justification
has a like effect. To use the word "excuse" in a provision relating
to provocation, which only reduces the offense, is an unfortunate
word choice. Some other term should be selected.
B. The wording of the voluntary manslaughter provision in the
proposed act.
The time has now come to make a decision as to the wording
of the voluntary manslaughter provision in the proposed Ken-
tucky Homicide Act. The first objective of the act is the definite
elimination of the negligent, voluntary manslaughter. Some
means must be devised to preclude continued adherance to the
line of cases supporting this impossible crime. The Legislature
must speak with an unnstakable voice.
A decision must also be made as to whether to follow the
English Homicide Act and the Model Penal Code, which have
greatly extended the historic doctrine of provocation. It has
been determined not to follow these current diversions in the
law Undoubtedly the provocation category is under fire and
will be extended. The new English Act and the Model Penal
Code will exert tremendous influence in that direction. But it is
believed that they go too far, at least for the present, in suddenly
turning the issue of provocation from a question of law and fact,
covered in an instruction by the judge to be applied by the
jury to the facts, into a matter wholly of fact to be decided by the
jury with practically no test. The law ordinarily moves more
slowly, even if it be assumed that it should move that far
eventually However, it is believed that the question of provoca-
ton should be handled in the proposed provision so as to give the
courts an opportunity to extend the mitigating effect of provoca-
tion as the law may develop in the United States and the British
Empire.
With these thoughts and other considerations in mind, it has
been determined to recommend alternate provisions on voluntary
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manslaughter. The first provision will be m definition form; the
alternate recommendation will be that the present provision m
KRS 485.020 be recodified. There is no definition of the offense
m KRS 435.020; the courts go to the common law to find the
particulars of the crime.
a. The first recommendation-that the proposed prov~son be
n definition form.
The first recommendation is that the voluntary manslaughter
provision be in definition form and m four parts. The proposed
wording of each of these parts and a discussion of each follow
(1) Provocation.
If an opportunity is to be given for an extension and develop-
ment of the concept of provocation, clearly it must not be defined
m terms of the four historic situations that now constitute provo-
cation. This would freeze the concept. It is believed that the
purpose can be achieved by stating the concept m terms of the
common law heat of passion and provocation. Then it will be
possible, if so desired, to extend these concepts by court decisions.
With that in mind, the following is suggested as this portion of
the proposed voluntary manslaughter provision:
Sec .................. Voluntary Manslaughter. An unlawful
homicide which would otherwise be willful murder shall
constitute voluntary manslaughter when:
(a) committed m sudden affray145 or heat of passion im-
mediately caused by a provocation sufficient to deprive a
reasonable man of his self-control and power of cool reflec-
tion. Sudden affray or provocation shall not reduce a
homicide to voluntary manslaughter if the jury finds that
the sudden affray or provocation raised no hot blood m the
offender in fact or that his blood had actually cooled.
This provision is phrased m terms of the common law It is
believed that it is sufficiently definite to properly circumscribe
the crime and at the same tine give an opportunity to the courts
to extend the concept of provocation. It would give the courts
145A substantial number of states add sudden quarrel (sudden affray)
to provocation as a reducing agent. See Model Penal Code §201.3(1) comment
at 42 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959), for a list of statutes. Sudden afray has a
definite histoncal background and does not fit naturally into the provocation
concept. So perhaps it should have a separate entity. See Moreland, The Law of
Homicide 69 (1952).
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an opportunity, if they so desired, to extend the concept m
accord with the provisions as to provocation m the new English
Homicide Act and in the Model Penal Code. Provocation does
not operate automatically; the accused must not m fact kill in
cold blood. It is not enough that a reasonable man would be
provoked if it be affirmatively shown that the accused was not
provoked. So, as provided m the new Louisiana Code,146 a pro-
vision is added placing this specific limitation upon provocation.
Otherwise it might be necessary to state "may constitute," instead
of "shall constitute" in the introductory phrasing of the statute.147
(2) Imperfect Self Defense.
The second part of the recommended voluntary manslaughter
provision relates to imperfect defense of self, of another person,
of habitation, and similar situations and is worded as follows:
(b) the homicide would be in defense of self, of another
person, or of habitation were it not for the fact that the
offender was at fault in bringing on the difficulty or in er-
roneously and unreasonably believing that his life or the
life of another was in danger, or in using greater force than
was reasonably necessary
This is a codification of common law imperfect defense of
self, of another person, or of habitation, and similar situations.
It has been repeatedly pointed out that the provocation concept
is not sufficiently broad to encompass all of the situations of
voluntary manslaughter at common law 148 This provision em-
braces one such situation.
Defense of self, of another person, or of habitation are old and
accepted excuses for intentional homicide. But the accused may
not be permitted to plead self defense or defense of another
person, or of habitation if he were at fault in bringing on the
difficulty In such cases the common law, while denying a
complete or perfect defense, did take the intermediate position
of permitting an imperfect defense and the crime was voluntary
146 See La. Stat. Ann. §§14-31 (West 1950).
147 It will be noted that the recommended statute provides: "An intentional
unlawful homicide, which would otherwise be willful murder shall constitute
voluntary manslaughter." (Emphasis added.)
148 Moreland, The Law of Homicide 87 (1952); 2 Burdick, Law of Crime
§461 (1946); Notes, 36 Ky. L.J. 443 (1948) and 37 Ky. L.j. 834 (1949) (both
citing Kentucky cases).
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manslaughter. Thus m the Kentucky case, Tabor v. Common-
wealth,'49 the defendant by his own actions had induced the
necessity for the homicide and thus could not avail himself of
perfect self-defense. 5 ' Somewhat similar to the imperfect self-
defense cases are those m which the accused erroneously and
unreasonably believed himself m danger of attack by the deceased
or unreasonably used greater force than was necessary Gadd v.
Commonwealth'5' seems to be one such case. Some of these
decisions expressly state that heat of passion is not always neces-
sary to make out the crime of voluntary manslaughter.5 2
Since these are situations where a defendant may be convicted
of voluntary manslaughter on an extenuating circumstance other
than provocation, and since such situations are well recognized
at common law and in Kentucky cases, it is thought that they
should be included in the codification, as it is believed that the
principles they embody should be continued in the law
(3) Mental Deficiency
The third part of the recommended provision on voluntary
manslaughter relates to mental deficiency not amounting to legal
insanity as a ground for reducing the offense of willful murder
to voluntary manslaughter, and is worded as follows:
(c) the person who committed the killing or was a
party to it was at the time suffering from such abnormality
of mmd, less than legal insanity, whether arising from a
condition of arrested or retarded development of mmd or
any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury, as
substantially impaired Ins mental responsibility for his acts
and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.
On a charge of willful murder, it shall be for the defense
to prove that the person charged is by virtue of this section
not liable to be convicted of willful murder.
The fact that one party to a killing is by virtue of this
section not liable to be convicted of willful murder shall not
affect the question whether the killing amounted to willful
murder in the case of any other party to it.
'4926 Ky. L. Rep. 754, 82 S.W 443 (Ct. App. 1904).
'
5 0 See generally Moreland, A Suggested Homicide Statute for Kentucky, 41
Ky. L.J. 139, 156 (1953) (Ky. cases discussed).
1513 05 Ky. 318, 204 S.W.2d 215 (1947).
i52 Note, 36 Ky. L.J. 443, 447 (1948).
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The section as drafted is founded upon a substantially similar
provision in the new English Homicide Act. The complete sec-
tion of the English act is worded as follows:
Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of another,
he shall not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from
such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition
of arrested or retarded development of mind or any in-
herent causes or induced by disease or injury) as sub-
stantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts
and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.153
The doctine of diminished responsibility because of mental
deficiency less than msanity has been recognized in several
states,154 and now under this new English Act also, as a means
of mitigating the harshness of the accepted test of legal insanity
It is argued that the borderline cases of mental deficiency,
though not sufficient to come within the legal tests of insanity,
and so not sufficient to entitle the defendant to a complete
acquital, should nevertheless serve to mitigate the offense and
reduce it to voluntary manslaughter 55 Several reasons are offered
for the acceptance of such mitigation. One is that such border-
line types should be less severely punished than sane persons.
While such persons are not msane according to the generally
accepted legal test of insanity, they are definitely less capable of
controlling themselves than normal persons. It is argued that
mdividuals with a substantial mental deficiency, though legally
sane, should receive less punishment than normal persons.
Tied in with tis reasoning is the current national and
international unrest and dissatisfaction with the legal test of
insanity Durham v. United States, 56 which in 1954 decided that
a defendant was insane "if his unlawful act was the product of
mental disease or mental defect" may have been a sport case at
the time but it has been almost literally followed in the insanity
153 Homicide Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, §2 (1957).
i54 Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 175 (1954).
155Diminshed responsibility is also used in some states wich divide
murder into degrees to reduce first degree intentional murder with premeditation
to second degree murder. See Keedy, A Problem of First Degree Murder: Fisher
v. United States, 99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 267 (1950).
The doctnne has also been rejected in some states. The count is about two
to one in favor of acceptance. See Weihofen, M6ntal Disorder as a Criminal
Defense 184-85 (1954) (listing states).
156 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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provision of the Model Penal Code. 5 7 Various states are bound
to be influenced by both of these sources. Psychologists and
psychiatrists who have to work with lawyers and courts n
admnimstering the legal test of insanity have long been critical of
it. There are those who, while not altogether satisfied with the
current legal test, yet feel unable at the present time to improve
upon it considering all the problems involved.5 Such persons
welcome the growing tendency to reduce intentional murder to
voluntary manslaughter as a means of softening somewhat the
legal test of insanity and also as an experiment which may lead
to a broadening of the legal test itself. It may well be doubted
whether the legal test of insanity will be changed in states like
Kentucky for some years. This reducing device might bridge the
gap until a later possible expansion of the legal test.
As stated earlier in the discussion, several Kentucky decisions
have accepted the doctrine that diminished mental responsibility
will reduce a willful murder to voluntary manslaughter. In the
first of these cases, Rogers v. Commonwealth,159 a conviction of
murder was reversed because of the trial court's failure to give an
instruction on voluntary manslaughter. The court said that the
mental condition of the accused "whether feeble-minded or other-
wise" was a factor to be taken into consideration by the jury in
determining whether the malice requisite for murder existed at
the time of the homicide. Three years later, in Mangrum v.
Commonwealth,160 the lower court instructed the jury that if they
believed the defendant insane to acquit him but if they believed
from the evidence that he was "of weak or feeble mind they
should consider that fact in determining the degree of his guilt."
Under the instruction he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter
and the appellate court affirmed the conviction.
The only exception to the doctrine in Kentucky is the next
case in the series, Perciful v. Commonwealth,6' where the court
followed the historic rule that the law does not take cognizance
of anything less than complete insanity as a defense or mitigation.
Said the court: "As msanity excuses altogether, it is at once appar-
157 Model Penal Code §4.01(1) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953).
158See Moreland, Mental Responsibility and the Crmnal Law-A Defense,
45 Ky. L.J. 215 (1956).
159 96 Ky. 24, 27 S.W 813 (1894).
160 19 Ky. L. Rep. 94, 39 S.W 703 (Ct. App. 1897).
161202 Ky. 673, 279 S.W 1062 (1925).
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ent that proof of insanity other than drunkenness would not
authorize a manslaughter conviction." 62 Apparently the court
was not advised of the two previous decisions allowing mental
deficiency less than insanity to reduce willful murder to voluntary
manslaughter.
Horn v. Commonwealth, 63 the last case in the series, reverts
to the prevailing Kentucky view that a disordered mental condi-
tion, less than legal insanity, that substantially interferes with the
defendant's ability to have the willfulness requisite for murder
may reduce an intentional killing to manslaughter. So there is
substantial support in Kentucky decisions for the doctrine.
(4) Drunkenness
The fourth part of the recommended provision on voluntary
manslaughter concerns drunkenness as a ground for reducing
willful murder to voluntary manslaughter and is worded as
follows:
(d) the person who committed the killing or was a
party to it was at the time so intoxicated as to be unable to
form the willfulness requisite for murder.
This suggested provision follows a number of Kentucky cases,
e.g., Long v. Commonwealth,'6 Lee v. Commonwealth,165 and
Henderson v. Commonwealth,166 that hold that the defendant's
drunkenness may reduce the offense from willful murder to volun-
tary manslaughter. Gregory's text on Kentucky criminal pro-
cedure reaches the same conclusion. 67
As stated in the discussion, supra at pages 91-98, there are two
rationalizations for a reduction on account of drunkenness, (1)
that the drunkenness may prevent the accused from having the
intention (willfulness) requisite for murder, and (2) that it may
1621d. at 678, 279 S.W at 1064 (1925). The court is in error in linking
insanity with drunkenness. Drunkenness is not insanity unless the drinking has
led to insanity an fact. While drunkenness as not a defense to crime, an crimes
requiring specific intent (as in assault with intent to kill) the prosecution cannot
make out the crime if the accused is too drunk to have the specific intent required
for the offense. That is the way drunkenness less than insanity operates as a
complete defense. A leading case is the English one, Director of Pub. Prosecutions
v. Beard [19201 A.C. 479.
163292 Ky. 587, 591-92, 167 S.W.2d 58, 60-61 (1943) (a "condition,"
however produced, may negative malice).
164 262 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1953).
165 329 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1959). See also Jones v. Commonwealth, 311 S.W.2d
190 (Ky. 1958); Pash v. Commonwealth, 146 Ky. 390, 142 S.W 700 (1912).
16624 Ky. L. Rep. 1985, 72 S.W 781 (Ct. App. 1903).
167 Gregory, Criminal Law, Procedure and Forms §94 (1918).
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create a situation where the mind is more easily inflamed
than that of an ordinary man and so he might have heat of
passion (provocation) Kentucky cases accept the reasoning in
the first category and so it has been incorporated m the proposed
provision.
Summary and Recapitulation
Gathering together the four parts of the proposed provision
on voluntary manslaughter, it reads as follows:
See ...................... Voluntary Manslaughter. An unlawful
homicide, which would otherwise be willful murder, shall
constitute voluntary manslaughter when:
(a) committed in sudden affray 1s or heat of passion
immediately caused by a provocation sufficient to deprive
a reasonable man of his self-control and power of cool re-
flection. Sudden affray or provocation shall not reduce a
homicide to voluntary manslaughter if the jury finds that
the sudden affray or provocation raised no heat of passion
in the offender in fact or that his blood had actually cooled.
(b) the homicide would be in defense of self, of another
person, or of habitation were it not for the fact that the
offender was at fault in bnnging on the difficulty, or in
erroneously and unreasonably believing that his life or the
life of another was in danger, or in using greater force than
was reasonably necessary
(c) the person who committed the killing or was a
party to it was at the time suffering from such abnormality
of mind, although not legally insane, whether arising from
a condition of retarded development of mind or any in-
herent causes or induced by disease or injury, as sub-
stantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts
and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.
(d) the person who committed the killing or was a
party to it was at the time so intoxicated as to be unable to
form the willfulness requisite for murder.
This voluntary manslaughter provision in four parts is an
attempt to codify existing Kentucky law on the offense except
as to the negligent voluntary manslaughter. Every effort has been
made to eliminate this impossible offense from Kentucky law
It is believed that this has been accomplished and that this legis-
16s Sudden affray does not fit easily m the provocation category so is often
added as an additional category. Note 145 supra; Pennigton v. Commonwealth,
244 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Ky. 1961).
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lative definition would make it clear that voluntary manslaughter
could occur only in the case of a willful (intentional) killing.
Part (a) of the definition is intended as a codification of
common law provocation and is believed to be a codification
of existing Kentucky law As stated in the discussion, the law as
to provocation as a reducing agent is being changed and extended.
This definition leaves an opportunity for the courts to extend
the law in accordance with trends in other states, if it is deemed
desirable to do so.
Part (b) is intended also as a codification of the common law
and of Kentucky decisions. Imperfect defense of self, of an-
other person, or of habitation and similar situations as a basis
for a conviction of voluntary manslaughter has a long history and
is recognized in other ]usdictions. Part (c), embodying mental
deficiency less than legal insanity as a ground for reducing a
willful killing, has been recognized in several Kentucky decisions,
and other states that have examined the doctrine have accepted
it by a two to one ma]ority It softens the legal test of insanity,
which is under strong national and international pressure, and
furnishes a most valuable device for cautious experimentation in
fringe cases of mental disorder. Part (d) embodies the Kentucky
rule that intoxication of the accused will serve to reduce a willful
murder to voluntary manslaughter if it renders him incapable of
forming the willfulness (intention) requisite for murder. The
rule, buttressed upon somewhat strained reasoning, is found in
several other states as well as in Kentucky and in England.
b. Alternate provaton.
As stated above, the study group has decided to recommend
an alternate provision which might be incorporated in the volun-
tary manslaughter section in lieu of the four part provision in
definition form discussed above. The study group recommends
as this alternate provision a recodification of the present voluntary
manslaughter provision, KRS 485.020, which reads as follows:
Voluntary manslaughter. Any person who commits vol-
untary manslaughter shall be confined in the penitentiary
for not less than two nor more than twenty-one years.
This provision contains no definition of the offense and the
Kentucky courts use the common law definition,
1962]
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The study group would prefer adoption of the four part
definition form provision because it clarifies the law and presents
it snply and more clearly Since the study group takes the
position that each of these parts is declaratory of Kentucky law
the same result could be reached under either recommendation.
But, while the study group prefers the provision in definition
form, it realizes that there may be those who might object to the
wording of some of the parts and so defeat the adoption of the
entire act. Therefore the recommendation is in alternative form
so that if those who might present the proposed act to the legisla-
ture deemed it wise the alternate rather than the recommended
definition may be used.
C. Involuntary (unintentional) manslaughter
Involuntary manslaughter is distinguished from voluntary
manslaughter m that involuntary manslaughter is an unintended
unlawful killing of a human being. A number of unintentional
homicides were murder at common law but other unintentional
killings were involuntary manslaughter.
Involuntary manslaughter at common law embraced two
closely related, not always distinguishable offenses. The first
was an umntentional killing resulting from a lawful act, done
without due caution and circumspection. This was the negligent
manslaughter. The second and closely allied offense was an unin-
tended homicide resulting from an unlawful act which was not a
felony 169 This was commonly called the misdemeanor man-
slaughter, although a civil wrong might satisfy the requisite
unlawful act. Both principles are now generally interpreted as
requiring an act dangerous to life or limb, so there is an over-lap
in their application, but they had an independent development
until about ninety years ago. These two fundamental categones1 70
forming the basis of the law of involuntary manslaughter will now
be discussed in turn.
169 1 East, Pleas of the Crown 255-71 (1803); Foster, Crown Law 258-65
(2d ed. 1791).1 70 The common law also recogmzed an additional category on both the
murder and manslaughter levels, homicide m resisting arrest. But as pointed out
in Hall, The Substantive Law of Crnmes-1887-1986, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 616, 642(1937), tls doctrine has so lost favor as to be out of the law. It is now interpreted
in terms of negligence. E.g., Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 818, 202
S.W.2d 634 (1947) (murder).
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(a) The Negligent Manslaughter
The negligent manslaughter, as the name implies, is an
involuntary manslaughter aasing out of criminal negligence on
the manslaughter level. A higher degree of negligence is required
for the negligent murder. This crime presents two important
problems. The first is the kind of standard to be employed in
determining criminal negligence on the manslaughter level. The
modem cases are uniform on this point; the standard employed
is that of the conduct of a reasonable man under the circum-
stances. This is called the objective standard of care.i7 1 The
defendant cannot hide behind his personal (subjective) belief
that his standard of conduct was not dangerous. He must meas-
ure up to the standard of what the community considers to be
dangerous conduct.
The second problem raised by the negligent manslaughter is
the degree of negligence required for conviction and how to
describe it. Practically all jurisdictions require more than ordi-
nary negligence; generally it is stated that the degree of negli-
gence is reached when the conduct of the accused creates such
an unreasonable risk of danger as to be recklessly disregardful of
human life and safety under the circumstances. This description
makes the required degree of negligence synonymous with reck-
lessness .
172
The Current Situation in Kentucky
Kentucky has no involuntary manslaughter statute. The crime
is pumshed in this state as a common law misdemeanor and
since there is no statutory penalty for the crime it is pumshable
under KRS 431.075. Tis statute will be quoted for it applies to
all common law crines for which there is no statutory penalty
Common law offenses, penalties for. Any person convicted
of a common law offense the penalty for winch is not other-
wise provided by statute shall be imprisoned m the county
jail for a term not exceeding twelve months or fined a sum
not exceeding five thousand dollars or both.' 73
i71 Moreland, The Law of Homicide 127-32 (1952).
172 Id. at 133-41. A leading case on the point is the recent English one,
Andrews v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1937] A.C. 576; see Model Penal Code
§201.3(1)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
173 KRS 431.075.
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It is immediately manifest that tis punishment is too lement
for some cases of negligent involuntary manslaughter. The negli-
gent voluntary manslaughter, that impossible crime, takes care
of such cases as well as those which in other states would be
negligent murder. The recategonzation of that offense is the
biggest problem in a reform of Kentucky homicide law
The decisions having to do with involuntary manslaughter, as
such, were in confusion in Kentucky prior to the recent case of
Marye v. Commonwealth.'74 There were some decisions which
seemed to indicate that more than ordinary negligence was
required for a conviction of involuntary manslaughter but other
cases seemed to hold that ordinary negligence was sufficient. At
any rate that particular matter was definitely cleared up in the
Marye case.
Marye unintentionally killed two persons while driving his
father's automobile. The lower court instructed the jury that
Marye would be guilty of involuntary manslaughter if he "care-
lessly and negligently" ran the automobile against the deceased
persons causing their deaths. The jury found Marye guilty on
each count; he had been indicted on two counts for involuntary
manslaughter, one for each person killed. The appellate court
reversed the conviction, holding that the instructions permitted
a conviction based upon ordinary negligence and that more than
ordinary negligence, namely gross negligence, was required.
Gross negligence, it should be pointed out, is an outmoded
phrase in defining the negligence requisite for involuntary man-
slaughter. The court defined gross negligence as the failure to
exercise slight care. As an editorial writer of the tme pointed
out, "slight care is practically no care at all."1 5 Most courts today,
as previously pointed out, use the term reckless to define the
negligence required for involuntary manslaughter. But Kentucky
continues to use gross negligence to define the degree of negli-
gence required for the crime. 76
The trouble is that the voluntary negligent manslaughter 7 7
has pre-empted the use of the word reckless for describing the
negligence requisite for involuntary manslaughter in this state.
174 Marye v. Commonwealth, 240 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1951).175 Lexngton Leader, November 13, 1951, p. 4.
176 Marye v. Commonwealth, 240 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1951).
17 7 Pp. 97-100 supra.
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Current Kentucky cases are consistent in using reckless and/or
wanton to define flus impossible crime.
Summation:
It has been shown that Kentucky law presents serious prob-
lems on both the voluntary and involuntary manslaughter levels.
There should be no negligent voluntary manslaughter, but there
is in Kentucky and it is defined as an unlawful homicide resulting
from wanton and/or reckless conduct. Only one other state has
been found that has this impossible crime. Furthermore the
crime has pre-empted the word reckless, which is the term ordi-
narily used to define the negligence requisite for involuntary
manslaughter. Unhappily, the Kentucky courts define the negli-
gence required for involuntary manslaughter as gross negligence.
Gross negligence is an out-moded term no longer used in criminal
law ' 7 The Kentucky Court of Appeals defines gross negligence
as want of slight care, which for all practical purposes is no care
at all. The situation is serious but the matter is so firmly en-
trenched in decision law that only legislative action will correct it.
(b) The Misdemeanor-Manslaughter
If a person unintentionally commits a honcide while in the
commission of a felony, he is guilty of murder at common law 180
The crime, usually designated as the felony-murder, survives
as a common law crime in Kentucky,181 although there are con-
trary decisions. Similarly, where one while in the commission of
an unlawful act not amounting to a felony unintentionally kills an-
other, it is involuntary manslaughter at common law, and this is
called the misdemeanor-manslaughter. The principle, like the
felony murder, finds ample support in the Kentucky cases.
However; the crime is punished as a common law misdemeanor
rather than as involuntary manslaughter 82 as in other states.
Originally, as in the case of the felony murder, the rule
operated automatically If it was shown that the accused was
178 E.g., Little v. Commonwealth, 844 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. 1961); Mullins v.
Commonwealth, 269 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1954); Marye v. Commonwealth, 240
S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1951).
179 And rarely in civil actions. It is an ambiguous phase which has been
almost wholly discarded.
181 Cases cited note 58 supra.
18 2 For an attempted rationalization of why the crime is punished as a
common law misdemeanor in Kentucky see Note, 89 Ky. L.J. 851 (1951).
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engaged in the commission of a nnsdemeanor, or even of a mere
civil wrong at the time of the unintended homicide, he was
guilty of manslaughter.'8 3 Later the law developed that the
unlawful act out of winch the killing arose must be malum in se
and not merely malum prohibitum. For a while the phrase malum
in se was interpreted to mean dangerous m itself, but it was
later interpreted to mean morally or socially dangerous in itself.
Under such an interpretation one who attempted to commit
suicide in a hundred acre field and unintentionally killed a tramp
asleep in a nearby clump of bushes would be guilty of man-
slaughter since attempted suicide, a common law misdemeanor,
is a morally reprehensible offense.
About mnety years ago a tendency toward a return to the
early meaning of the phrase became apparent. This arose first
on the murder level in a series of vitriolic attacks by Judge
Stephen culminating in ins instonc decision in Regina v. Sern4'8
that a person accused of murder would not be guilty under the
felony murder rule unless the felony out of winch the homicide
arose was dangerous in itself. Tins fortunate return to the early
meaning of the doctrine had its parallel on the misdemeanor
manslaughter level in the leading case of Regina v. Franklin.185
Since these two cases the law in England has been that the
basic test is the amount of danger in the act causing the death
rather than its lawfulness or unlawfulness.186
American courts are gradually, but surely, coming to the
same conclusion. Professor Robinson states the situation as
follows:
[The] phrase not amounting to a felony is not of much
present day importance, because courts have ruled that it is
not the fact that the subordinate act, either misdemeanor
or felony, is prohibited by statute, but that it is the char-
actenstics of the prohibited subordinate act that make the
unintended killing a crime. If the subordinate act is danger-
ous to the lives and safety of others, then a killing, though
unintended, winch occurs in the commission of the sub-
ordinate act is a criminal homicide, provided, of course,
188 Moreland, The Law of Homicide 186 (1952).
184 [1887] 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 311.
185 [1883] 15 Cox Cnm. Cas. 163.
186 Moreland, The Law of Homicide 222 (1952).
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that the killing was the natural or necessary consequence
of the subordinate act.'87
Stated in this way, the misdemeanor manslaughter is prac-
tically synonymous with the negligent manslaughter, and that is
the current opinion. 88 The test in all such cases then becomes
the usual criterion for criminal negligence on the manslaughter
level: did the conduct of the accused amount to reckless disre-
gard for human life and safety under the circumstances?
189
The language used in many of the Kentucky misdemeanor
manslaughter cases would seem to indicate a blind following of
the historic rule that an unintentional homicide occurring m the
course of an unlawful act less than a felony is necessarily man-
slaughter, even though there was no danger involved in the act.
For example, the Kentucky Court of Appeals said m a recent
opinion:
Involuntary manslaughter is the killing of another m
doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony and not
likely to endanger human life and without intention to kill,
or the killing of another while doing a lawful act in an
unlawful or negligent manner, where the negligence is such
as to indicate a disregard for human life. °0 (Emphasis
added.)
Does the Kentucky Court of Appeals really intend to say that
a killing occurring in the commission of an unlawful act not likely
to endanger human life is involuntary manslaughter?
William Rice in a recent study of the Kentucky misdemeanor
manslaughter cases' 9 ' comes to the conclusion that, while the
language used by the court would seem to go that far, the facts in
practically all of the cases where such language is used show
sufficient negligence to warrant a conviction on that ground. He
concludes that "whether Kentucky, or indeed most any court
i87 Robmson, Manslaughter by Motorsts, 22 Min. L. Rev. 755 (1938). See
generally id. at 774.
ts8E.g., Model Penal Code §201.8(1) (a) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959), which
eliminates the misdemeanor manslaughter category and makes "recklessness" the
test for the negligent manslaughter.
189 See the disusson of the negligent manslaughter, p. 113 supra; Moreland,
The Law of Homicide 195 (1952); Model Penal Code §201.3(1) (a) (Tent. Draft
No. 9, 1959).
190 Middleton v. Commonwealth, 804 Ky. 784, 785, 202 S.W.2d 610, 611
(1947) (citing smilar cases).
'9' Note, 41 Ky. L.J. 94 (1952).
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will convict of involuntary manslaughter on the sole ground that
the homicidal act was committed in the perpetration of an
unlawful act where there is no negligence is doubtful."1 92
The oft-repeated rule of the court on this matter is most
unfortunate. The rule is outmoded and unsound and may lead
to a result of injustice in a particular case at any time. The doc-
trine should be rephrased to conform to the present consensus
of judicial opinion that a homicide occurring in the course of a
misdemeanor is not involuntary manslaughter unless the mis-
demeanor is suffciently dangerous in itself to cause the de-
fendant's act to be criminally negligent.
(c) Homicide resulting from an act creating such an extreme
risk of death or great bodily injury as to manifest a wanton
indifference to human life, as involuntary manslaughter in
the first degree.
The discussion of involuntary manslaughter up to this point
would seem to indicate that the recommended statutory definition
of the offense would embrace the two closely related common
law offenses, the negligent manslaughter and the misdemeanor
manslaughter. It would further appear that the recommended
provision would adopt the current opinion that the misdemeanor
manslaughter is practically synonymous with the negligent man-
slaughter, so that the recommended test in all involuntary man-
slaughter cases would be the usual criterion for criminal negli-
gence on the manslaughter level: did the conduct of the accused
amount to reckless disregard for human life and safety under the
circumstances? 193
But such is not to be the case. Such a provision would
represent modem thinking as to involuntary manslaughter, as
illustrated by the provision defining the crime in the Model Penal
Code of the American Law Institute. However, those who have
worked upon the recommended Homicide Act have come to a
conclusion which involves the addition of unintended homicides
arising out of wanton negligence to the involuntary manslaughter
provision.
Such a deviation from the Model Code definition and the
prevailing situation in practically all other states, most of which
_192Id. at 96.
193 See pp. 116-17 supra.
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retain the negligent murder, 9 4 is occasioned m part by the at-
tempt to eliminate that impossible crime, the negligent voluntary
manslaughter, by moving cases which are negligent murder in
most other states into the involuntary manslaughter category
This is done by suggesting that involuntary manslaughter shall
be divided into two degrees: (1) involuntary manslaughter in the
first degree, requiring an act creating such extreme risk of death
or great bodily injury as to manifest a wanton indifference to the
value of human life according to the standard of conduct of a
reasonable man under the circumstances, and (2) involuntary
manslaughter in the second degree requiring recklessness only
It is of course intended that real meaning be given the
word wanton in the definition of involuntary manslaughter in
the first degree for otherwise the purpose of adding it to the
customary definition of involuntary manslaughter would be de-
feated. For example, it is not intended that it be interpreted as
synonymous with "reckless," the word used in defining involuntary
manslaughter in the second degree. The two words are not
synonyms, although sometimes carelessly and loosely used as
such, as in the current definition of negligent voluntary man-
slaughter in Kentucky '95 One of the most satisfactory definitions
of wantonness is found in the dictionary where it is defined as
"arrogant recklessness."196 Recklessness is the word that is most
commonly used in describing the behavior required for the
negligent involuntary manslaughter. The addition of the adjec-
tive "arrogant" is indicative of the "still higher degree" of danger
and the "depraved mind"1 7 commonly required in other jursdic-
tions for murder.9 " It is intended that the use of the phrase
"wanton indifference to the value of human life" in the definition
of involuntary manslaughter in the first degree shall serve to bring
those cases which would be negligent murder in other jursdic-
tions, and which are presently negligent voluntary manslaughter
in Kentucky, into the coverage of the involuntary manslaughter
in the first degree provision recommended in the proposed act.
'94 Moreland, The Law of Homicide ch. 13 at 213-17 (1952).
195 See Marye v. Commonwealth, 240 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1951).
190 Webster, New International Dictionary 2871 (2d ed. 1934).
197 See pp. 67-68 supra.
198 Moreland, A Rationale of Criminal Negligence 68-65 (1944); Moreland,
The Law of Homicide 33-84 (1952); see Tincher, Proposed Statutory Reform of
Negligent Homicide in Kentucky, 80 Ky. L.J. 341, 356 n.84 (1942).
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The desire to eliminate the negligent voluntary manslaughter
and other reasons which have prompted inclusion of the second
degree involuntary manslaughter provision m the proposed act
will now be discussed in more detail.
(1) The desire to eliminate the negligent voluntary man-
slaughter.
As has been stated, a primary objective of those who have
worked upon the recommended Homicide Act is the elimination
of the negligent voluntary manslaughter. As pointed out in the
discussion supra, the crime is a contradiction in terms, since a
negligent act is never a voluntary (willful) one, no matter how
great the negligence.
There is a division of case authority as to whether the common
law negligent murder survives in this state.""' Those judges who
repudiated the placing of this common law offense upon the
murder level apparently thought that the penalty for involuntary
manslaughter, where such an unintended killing would naturally
fall, was too lement, so the offense of voluntary negligent man-
slaughter was created to take care of such cases.200
Faulty reasoning supported the placing of such cases in the
voluntary manslaughter category One was the argument that
one intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts.
It is true that such a proposition, somewhat shaky at its best,
appears in the law of homicide on the intentional murder level.
But the rule is never applied unless the result is practically certain
to follow from the act,201 as when, for example, one fires a gun
into a crowd of people. There a result of death or grievous bodily
harm to someone is practically certain and if a killing occurs the
crime may be intended murder Not so in the negligence cases.
There the result is never practically certain (if it is negligence)
and the offense is never intended.
It is believed that the best explanation for the creation of
the negligent voluntary manslaughter is, as suggested, that it was
199 See pp. 67-75 supra and authorities cited.200 Common law negligent murder may also be prosecuted as a common law
offense (murder) under KRS 431.075 but the pumshment provided by this
statute is so lement as to make the offense of little value as a practical matter.
Ordinarily the prosecutor will attempt to get a conviction of voluntary man-
slaughter where the pumshment runs, m the discretion of the jury, from two to
twenty-one years.
201 Moreland, The Law of Homicide 18-19 (1952); pp. 97-98 supra.
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an attempt to reach a proper result as to the punishment in such
cases. Not willing to convict such offenders of common law
negligent murder, yet believing that the penalty for involuntary
manslaughter was too lenient, the judiciary created the new
offense, which in a way solved the problem of punishment, since
it permitted the jury in its discretion to give a punishment ranging
from two to twenty-one years, but created a preposterous tech-
mcal situation by placing the crme in the voluntary man-
slaughter category
But whatever the reasoning that led to the creation of the
negligent voluntary manslaughter may have been, the offense was
created and its presents a situation that should be corrected. The
proposed act recommends placing such cases in the involun-
tary manslaughter category Such homicides are unintended kill-
mgs and so to label them involuntary manslaughter is perfectly
reasonable. However, the fact remains that placing such homi-
cides m the involuntary manslaughter category does reduce such
offenses from murder to involuntary manslaughter, the wisdom of
which might be questioned.
(2) Various additional factors making the reduction desir-
able.
The negligent murder is unpopular in Kentucky There has
always been a split of authority in the state as to the survival of
the common law negligent murder.02 The only statutory murder
in the state is willful murder.20 ' The Kentucky Legislature made
its position clear as to the common law negligent murder when it
promulgated KRS 431.075. That statute, which makes a prosecu-
tion for a negligent murder highly improbable because of the
small punishment it provides, indicates that the Kentucky Legis-
lature considered the negligent murder concept unwise public
policy
The fact that this offense is punished as murder in almost
every other state and that it is embodied in the current Homicide
Act promulgated by the American Law Institute2 4 has naturally
been a source of considerable concern to those who are recom-
mending that the offense be placed in the involuntary man-
202 Pp. 67-75 supra.
203 KRS 435.010.
204 Model Penal Code §201.2(1)(b) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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slaughter category This concern is increased by the fact that in
some states, including New York205 for example, the offense may
incur a statutory penalty of murder m the first degree. But, while
this is true, prosecutions of the offense under state murder
statutes are not very common and convictions of murder exceed-
ingly rare. An exammation of the Sixth Decemal Digest of the
American Digest System for the ten-year period, 1946-1956,
verifies this conclusion. Compilers of casebooks on criminal law
are still able to find cases where the accused was convicted of
murder in some degree, but these decisions are gradually becom-
ing scarcer.
Does this mean that the offense is a mere historic survivor
and continued in state statutes without a re-examination of its
present day desirability? More importantly, may one pursue the
same line of thought and question whether the offense was
incorporated in the current draft of the Model Penal Code with-
out sufficient consideration of the wisdom of such categonzation?
It is believed that a negative answer should be given to such
questions. The offense is still alive and it still has utility Occa-
sionally the facts of a particular homicide indicate conduct so very
dangerous and so callous and extremely indifferent to human life
and safety as to warrant the punishment reserved for murder206
One may go further and say that if he were drafting a homicide
act for any other state but Kentucky, he would incorporate the
offense in the murder category Where the great majority of
states solve a problem in a particular way, there is a strong urge
to do likewise.
But this act is not being prepared for use in any state other
than Kentucky While Kentucky stands almost alone, the state
has made it clear by statute and by decision that she does not
support the punishment of the negligent murder as murder, but
as manslaughter. That manifest state public policy is decisive
on the matter, it is believed. At any rate it has been the decisive
factor to those working on the proposed act.
It should be added however that while existing Kentucky
policy and law have been the decisive factors in incorporating the
common law negligent murder in the involuntary manslaughter
205 N.Y. Penal Law §1044.
206 E.g., Collings, Negligent Murder-Some Stateszde Footnotes to Director of
Public Prosecutions v. Smith, 49 Cal. L. Rev. 254 (1961).
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division of the proposed act, an additional factor has been the
fact that the group working upon the act is somewhat hesitant
to reactivate the offense.0 7 This offense is, after all, unintentional
and there is a certain hesitancy to punish the offense with
penalties reserved for murder, regardless of what is done in other
states. Five persons worked upon the proposed act. One of these
was strongly opposed to incorporating the negligent murder in
the act on the ground that an unintended killing should not be
puished as murder. Another member of the group took a strong
position for the mcorporation of the negligent murder in the act
on the ground that it was a common law offense, was incorporated
in practically all state homicide acts, and that certain unintended
wantonly negligent killings merited that high degree of punish-
ment. In the end the group of five voted four to one to continue
punishing the offense as manslaughter. The net result is that
unintended homicides arising out of wanton negligence, now
punished in the state as negligent voluntary manslaughter would
be punished under the act as involuntary manslaughter in the first
degree thus creating a technically correct label for such offenses,
since they are, in fact, unintended (involuntary)
(3) The desire to elimnnate the felony willful murder.
There is an unfortunate line of decisions in Kentucky which
give credence to an impossible crime, the felony willful murder.20,
This crime is on its face a contradiction in terms, because the
felony murder is an unintentional homicide, not a willful one.
Apparently the Kentucky courts coined the offense when they
repudiated the common law felony murder. The punishment for
involuntary manslaughter, a year in the county jail or a fine of
5000 dollars or both, was considered too small for such a killing
so the courts created the new offense, the felony willful murder,
which has a punishment of confinement for life or death under
Kentucky's willful murder statute, KRS 431.010.
The crime, like the negligent voluntary manslaughter, should
be weeded out of the law However, the offense is so firmly
embedded in the cases that it is believed that there would be little
hope that the courts would repudiate it by overruling the doc-
207 There are a number of distingmshed American and English authorities
who have rejected the notion of negligent murder. Id. at 268.
208 pp. 83-84 supra.
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trine. Not only would the courts have to repudiate cases like
Tarrance v. Commonwealth2 9 and similar decisions supporting
the doctrine209a but the punishment for common law felony
murder or involuntary manslaughter would still be, under KRS
431.075, a maximum of one year confinement or a fine of 5000
dollars, or both, an insufficient punishment for such an offense as
the common law felony murder.
It is believed that the proposed new offense, involuntary
manslaughter in the first degree, offers a solution to the problem.
This solution is buttressed upon the following reasoning. As
pointed out in the foregoing discussion at pages 75-76, the felony
murder doctrine exists today only if the felony out of which the
killing arose was extremely dangerous to life and limb and likely
in itself to cause death. How dangerous? So extremely dangerous
as to make the act wantonly indifferent to the lives and safety of
others.210 Thus, today, the conduct required for the felony murder
is the same as that required for the negligent murder.
And therein lies the solution to the felony willful murder in
Kentucky This paper has gone to considerable length to develop
the proposition that the common law negligent murder (currently
punished as negligent voluntary manslaughter in Kentucky)
should be punished under a proposed involnutary manslaughter
in the first degree statute, which defines the new offense in
terms commonly used in other states to describe the negligent
murder. It is now proposed to punish the common law felony
murder (currently punished as felony willful murder in Ken-
tucky) under the same recommended involuntary manslaughter
in the first degree statute since the definition of the felony
murder has become parallel with the definition of the negligent
murder in current thinking and modem cases.
(d) The problem of punishment for manslaughter-voluntary
and involuntary.
The problem of punishment for both voluntary and involun-
tary manslaughter remains to be solved. At the present time the
punishment for voluntary manslaughter under KRS 435.020 is
209 265 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1953).
209a Cases cited notes 77-80 supra.
21o See cases cited note 55 supra.
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confinement in the penitentiary for not less than two nor more
than twenty-one years; the proposed Act recommends no change.
Involuntary manslaughter is not a statutory offense in Ken-
tucky but a common law misdemeanor, the punishment for which
under KlRS 481.075 is imprisonment in the county jail for a term
not exceeding twelve months or by a fine not exceeding 5000 dol-
lars, or both. However, the crime of involuntary manslaughter, as
proposed in the Homicide Act, includes not only those offenses
now punished under KRS 431.075, but in addition homicides
arsing out of wanton negligence now punished under KRS
435.020 as negligent voluntary manslaughter by confinement in
the penitentiary for not less than two nor more than twenty-one
years. So it is immediately seen that the proposed involuntary
manslaughter provision is an enlarged, consolidated one in-
corporating exsting punishments ranging all the way from
a minmum of a fine to a maximum of twenty-one years in the
penitentiary
Alternate methods of handling the punishment for the en-
larged offense are possible. One method is to provide a punish-
ment for the crime of involuntary manslaughter to range all the
way from a minimum of a fine, let us say, to whatever maximum
imprisonment is deemed desirable. The jury would fix the punish-
ment to be given in a particular case within the bounds of the
broad scale prescribed. One objection to this method is that a
jury might punish involuntary manslaughter by a penalty far in
excess of the present punishment.
The other method of handling the problem of punishment
under the proposed enlarged involuntary manslaughter statute
would be to divide the offense into first and second degrees pro-
viding for each degree the minimum and maximum pumshment.
It has been determined to divide the crime into two degrees.
Involuntary manslaughter in the first degree will encompass the
unintentional homicide arising out of an act creating such an
extreme risk of death or great bodily injury as to manifest a
wanton indifference to human life and safety according to the
standard of conduct of a reasonable man under the circumstances.
Involuntary manslaughter in the first degree could be pumshable
by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than two nor
more than fifteen years. This pumshment is suggestive and might
1962]
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be changed in the discretion of those who give further considera-
tion to the problem. It will be noted that the maximum punish-
ment suggested, fifteen years, is six years less than the possible
maximum punishment possible for the existing negligent volun-
tary manslaughter, and that the proposed categorization includes
possible extreme cases which would be negligent voluntary man-
slaughter under existing Kentucky law However, it is thought
that the maximum punishment for involuntary manslaughter
should not be as great as the maximum of twenty-one years
provided for voluntary manslaughter.
It is recommended that involuntary manslaughter in the
second degree be made an unintentional homicide arising out of
an act showing reckless disregard for human life and safety It
is suggested that the punishment prescribed for that offense be
confinement in the county ]ail for a period not exceeding one year
or a fine not exceeding 5000 dollars or both. This is the existing
punishment for involuntary manslaughter under KRS 431.075.
Recapitulation of Suggested Punishment for Voluntary and
Involuntary Manslaughter
A. Voluntary manslaughter. Confinement in the penitentiary
for not less than two nor more than twenty-one years.
B. Involuntary Manslaughter.
(1) Involuntary manslaughter in the first degree. Confine-
ment in the penitentiary for not less than two nor more than
fifteen years.
(2) Involuntary manslaughter in the second degree. Im-
prisonment in the county jail for a term not exceeding twelve
months or a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or both.
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that existing penalties
for manslaughter, voluntary and involuntary, vary widely in the
different states. Typical maxima for manslaughter (where the
offense is not divided into voluntary and involuntary divisions),
or voluntary or first degree manslaughter where those crimes are
separated, are 10-20 years imprisonment. Minima, if any, are
typically short, such as one year. Involuntary manslaughter or
second degree manslaughter, where those crimes are separated,
is typically pumshable by a maximum of 5 years or less.211 Thus
211 The following footnote, taken from the Model Penal Code §201.3, corn-
(Continued on next page)
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it is apparent that individuals, like the states, will vary widely
as to the penalties for manslaughter, particularly where it in-
cludes, as in the recommended Homicide Act, what in other
jurisdictions is ordinarily punished as negligent murder. Those
who have worked upon the act have followed existing Kentucky
law on the matter so far as seemed possible.
III. PROPosED HOMICIDE ACT
The group which has studied the homicide laws of Kentucky
recommends the adoption of the following Homicide Act:
Murder. Any person who commits willful murder shall be
punished by confinement in the penitentiary for life, or for
a minimum of twenty years before becoming eligible for
parole, or by death.
Comment: These recommendations change existing Kentucky
law in only one particular-three instead of two choices of punish-
ment are provided. At present the jury has a choice between
life imprisonment and death. As pointed out in an editorial in the
Courier journal on February 16, 1960, juries are often reluctant
to give a death sentence, while for offenses which shock the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
ment at 49 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959), is presented as a categorization of the
punishment provided for manslaughter in the various states:
A tabulation of existing provisions:
[Sentencel [No. of Statesi [Sentence] [No. of Statesi
5-21 1 1-14 1
5-20 1 1-12 1
5-15 1 1-10 10
4-Life 2 1-8 2
2-30 1 1-5 2
2-21 2 4 mos.-20 1
2-10 1 O-Life 1
2-7 1 0-30 1
1-30 1 0-20 5
1-21 1 0-15 3
1-15 1 0-10 4
1-20 2 0-1 1
Involuntary manslaughter or second degree manslaughter, where those crines
are separated, is typically punished by a maximum of five years or less.
[Sentencel [No. of Statesi [Sentencel [No. of Statesi
3-5 1 0-15 2
1-5 1 0-10 1
1-3 1 0-5 3
3 mos.-3 1 0-4 2
0-20 1 0-8 3
0-1 4
Under the Wisconsin reckless homicide statute, the maximum imprisonment
is five years, and there is no nmmum.
1962]
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community a life sentence, which can end in eight years by parole
under 439.110(8), sometimes sets off a public outcry So a death
sentence may be deemed too severe, and a life sentence, subject
to parole in eight years, too lement. As suggested in the editorial,
a third choice of a immum of twenty years before possibility of
parole would fill this gap and give the jury a much needed
additional choice.
Voluntary Manslaughter-
(1) An unlawful homicide, which would otherwise be willful
murder, shall constitute voluntary manslaughter when:
(a) committed m sudden affray or heat of passion im-
mediately caused by a provocation sufficient to deprive
a reasonable man of his self-control and power of cool
reflection
(b) the homicide would be in defense of self, of another
person, or of habitation were it not for the fact that the
offender was at fault m bringing on the difficulty, or m
erroneously and unreasonably believing that his life or
the life of another was in danger, or m using greater
force than was reasonably necessary
(c) the person who committed the killing or was a party to
it was at the tune suffering from such abnormality of
mind, although not legally insane, whether arising
from a condition of retarded development of mind or
any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury, as
substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his
acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the
killing
(d) the person who committed the killing or was a party to
it was at the time so intoxicated as to be unable to
form the willfulness requisite for murder
(2) any person who commits voluntary manslaughter shall be
confined in the penitentiary for not less than two nor more
than twenty-one years
Comment: This four part voluntary manslaughter provision
in an attempt to codify existing Kentucky law except for the
negligent, voluntary manslaughter. The offense which is now
called negligent, voluntary manslaughter is transferred to the
involuntary manslaughter provision. If the plan has been
achieved, a voluntary manslaughter can occur under the proposed
act in the case of a willful (intentional) killing only
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Part (a) of the definition is intended as a codification of the
common law as to provocation and is believed to be a codifica-
tion of existing Kentucky law212 The law as to provocation as a
reducing agent is being extended in a number of jurisdictions.
This definition, it is believed, allows the courts, if they desire, to
follow the trend of these jurisdictions.
Part (b) is intended also as a codification of the common law,
supported by Kentucky decision. Imperfect defense of self, of
another, or of habitation as a basis for a conviction of voluntary
manslaughter has a long history and is recognized in other
jurisdictions. Part (c) softens the legal test of insanity, which is
under strong national and international pressure, and furnishes a
most valuable device for cautious experimentation in frmge
cases of mental disorder. The provision is taken from the new
English act of 1959. Part (d) is a codification of the rule found
in a number of Kentucky cases that intoxication of the accused
will serve to reduce willful murder to voluntary manslaughter
if it renders him incapable of forming the willfulness (intention)
requisite for murder.
One reason for including Parts (b), (c), and (d) in the
proposed provision, aside from their own intrinsic value, is to
assist in making clear the legislative intent that negligent volun-
tary manslaughter is abolished by the act. Kentucky cases
supporting the offense are no longer to be followed by the courts.
An alternate voluntary manslaughter provision is also pre-
sented.
Voluntary manslaughter. Any person who commits volun-
tary manslaughter shall be confined in the penitentiary for
not less than two nor more than twenty-one years.
Comment: This is a recodification of KRS 485.020. While the
study group prefers the four part, definition form provision it
realizes that there may be objection to the wording in some of the
parts which could defeat the whole act in the legislature. This
alternate is suggested for such a contingency
The pumshment for voluntary manslaughter remains un-
changed under the proposed Act.
212 Sudden affray does not fit easily in the provocation category so is often
added as an additional category. Note 145 supra; Pennington v. Commonwealth,
344 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Ky. 1961).
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Involuntary manslaughter.
Involuntary manslaughter in the first degree. Any person
who causes the death of a human being by an act creating
such extreme risk of death or great bodily injury as to
manifest a wanton indifference to the value of human life
according to the standard of conduct of a reasonable man
under the circumstances shall be confined in the peni-
tentiary for not less than two nor more than fifteen years.
Involuntary manslaughter in the second degree. Any
person who causes the death of a human being by reckless
conduct according to the standard of conduct of a reason-
able man under the circumstances shall be imprisoned in
the county jail for a term not exceeding twelve months or
fined a sum not exceeding five thousand dollars or both.
Comment: It is intended that the definition of involuntary
manslaughter in the first degree include what would be negligent
murder in most other states. Three principal factors have caused
the inclusion of the common law negligent murder situations m
the involuntary manslaughter in the first degree provision: (1) a
desire to eliminate the negligent voluntary manslaughter from
Kentucky law, (2) the belief that regardless of the situation in
most other states, neither the Legislature nor Kentucky courts
favor the crime of negligent murder, but believe the offense
should be no more than manslaughter even where the negligence
is of high degree, and (8) a hope that the courts will now
repudiate the felony willful murder and divert such cases to the
new involuntary manslaughter in the first degree category since
such cases are really unintentional felony homicide situations
where the test of liability should be extreme danger in the
felonious act, not willfullness.
The punishment for involuntary manslaughter m the first
degree is merely a suggestion, and is less than the present pumsh-
ment for negligent voluntary manslaughter, the offense for which
the provision is primarily intended.
Involuntary manslaughter in the second degree embraces
those cases now punished as common law involuntary manslaugh-
ter. By using the phrase "reckless conduct" 213 in the proposed
213 It should be noted that the Model Code uses the one word "recklessly"
to define the negligence requisite for manslaughter (the Model Code also incorpo-
rates the negligent murder). Model Penal Code §201(1) (a) (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959). "Reckless conduct," the phrase used m this proposed provision, is taken
(Continued on next page)
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provision, the phrase employed by most other jurisdictions and
the Model Penal Code, it is hoped that the definition of the negli-
gence required for common law involuntary manslaughter will be
more clear than the one currently used by the Court of Appeals.
2 14
The proposed punishment is the same as the existing one,
inpnsonment in the county ]ail for a term not exceeding twelve
months or a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or both. It
is believed that juries and the public generally do not subscribe
to a pumshment greater than this for a negligent homicide on this
level.
Proposed Homicide Act in Compact Form
In order that the reader may see the entire act in compact
form with no comments it is presented below-
Murder. Any person who commits willful murder shall be punished
by confinement in the penitentiary for life, or for a minimum of
twenty years before becoming eligible for parole, or by death.
Voluntary Manslaughter. (1) An unlawful homicide, which would
otherwise be willful murder, shall constitute voluntary manslaugh-
ter when:
(a) committed in sudden affray or heat of passion immedi-
ately caused by a provocation sufficient to deprive a
reasonable man of his self-control and power of cool
reflection
(b) the homicide would be in defense of self, of another
person, or of habitation were it not for the fact that the
offender was at fault in bringing on the difficulty, or in
erroneously and unreasonably believing that his life or
the life of another was in danger, or in using greater
force than was reasonably necessary
(c) the person who conimitted the killing or was a party
to it was at the time suffering from such abnormality
of mind, although not legally insane, whether arising
from a condition of retarded development of mind or
any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury, as
substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his
acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the
killing
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
from the new Wisconsi Criminal Code, which uses no description other than thus
phrase. Wis. Stat. Ann §940.06 (1958). "Recklessly" or "reckless conduct" is now
commonly used to describe this offense. Compare KRS 435.010 which uses the one
word "willful" to describe intentional murder.
214 See pp. 123-24 supra.
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(d) the person who committed the killing or was a party
to it was at the time so intoxicated as to be unable to
form the willfulness requisite for murder
(2) any person who commits voluntary manslaughter shall be
confined m the penitentiary for not less than two nor more
than twenty-one years
[Voluntary manslaughter. Any person who commits voluntary
manslaughter shall be confined in the penitentiary for not less than
two nor more than twenty-one years.] (This is the alternate pro-
vision.)
Involuntary manslaughter.
Involuntary manslaughter m the first degree. Any person who
causes the death of a human being by an act creating such extreme
risk of death or great bodily injury as to manifest a wanton mdif-
ference to the value of human life according to the standard of
conduct of a reasonable man under the circumstances shall be
confined in the penitentiary for not less than two nor more than
fifteen years. 215
Involuntary manslaughter m the second degree. Any person
who causes the death of a human being by reckless conduct ac-
cording to the standard of conduct of a reasonable man under the
circumstances shall be imprisoned m the county ]ail for a term not
exceeding twelve months or fined a sum not exceeding five thou-
sand dollars or both.
215 When the 1962 Kentucky Legislature adopted tlus provision (KRS
435.022) the nummum imprisonment was reduced from two years to one year.
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